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On April 24, 1996, President Clinton signed the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).' Thus, the AEDPA
era began. While Clinton's presidential signing statement paid lip
service 2 to meaningful federal court review of state court convictions,
AEDPA's supporters knew better. The fix was in, and happy habeas
days were here again. Gone were the years of waiting to carry out
executions; AEDPA's "opt-in" provisions with the short statute of
limitations, 3 expedited timetable for federal review, 4 and other
t Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, and Director, Cornell Death Penalty Project. I would like to thank Susan Hackett for her data collection assistance and
Brad Weinstein and Julie Jones for their research assistance. I would also like to thank
those who participated in this Symposium, especially Sheri Johnson, Larry Yackle, and
Trevor Morrison, as well as my colleagues Steve Garvey and Ted Eisenberg for their helpful
comments and suggestions. I would especially like to thank Keir Weyble for the discussions
and debates we have had over the years regarding AEDPA.
1 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
2 I use the term "lip service" deliberately. President Clinton could easily have
derailed AEDPA. But he made no attempt to do so; in fact, he encouraged congressional
Democrats to vote for the legislation. See James S. Liebman, An "Effective Death Penalty"?
AEDPA and ErrorDetection in Capital Cases, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 411, 413 (2001); Marianne L.
Bell, Note, The Option Not Taken: A ProgressiveReport on Chapter 154 of the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, 9 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 607, 615-16 (2000). In any event, in
his signing statement, President Clinton said, "I have signed this bill because I am
confident that the Federal courts will interpret these provisions to preserve independent
review of Federal legal claims. .. ." Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 719, 720 (April 24, 1996).
3 See 28 U.S.C. § 2263 (2000).
4 See id. § 2266.
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procedural "fixes"'5 would eliminate the interminable delays and fasttrack death. Also gone were the days of a lone federal judge or panel
of judges routinely finding constitutional defects in state court
convictions. For all practical purposes, this overturning of the state
court apple cart would be eliminated by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),
colloquially referred to as the deference provision. With its
requirement that the great writ of habeas corpus could only be issued
if a federal judge determined the state court decision was "contrary
to" or an "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court precedent, 6
AEDPA's supporters believed that they had firmly bound the Article
III hands. 7 Although AEDPA's habeas "reform" provisions made a
number of other modifications to habeas corpus practice and
procedure, a few of which will be discussed later in this Article, the
opt-in sections and § 2254(d) were the centerpieces of the new habeas
revolution. 8

But, as the old saying goes, "What if you gave a revolution and
nobody came?" As I will argue, that is in many (but not all) respects
what happened. Today, almost nine years after AEDPA came into
effect, not a single state has successfully opted in to the special capital
case procedures that AEDPA's drafters were so proud of. And while
§ 2254(d) has made the difference in a handful of cases, 9 the writ of
habeas corpus lives on. In fact, the Supreme Court has been just as
involved in reviewing-and overturning-state court convictions and
5 See, e.g., id. § 2264 (applying more restrictive procedural default rules for qualifying
opt-in jurisdictions).
6 Section 2254(d) provides that the writ of habeas corpus
shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim (1)
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
Id. § 2254(d).
7 See Kent S. Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative Power, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 888, 945 (1998) (noting that § 2254(d) is "the key element of the 1996
reform of habeas corpus").
8 See Alan K. Chen, Shadow Law: Reasonable Unreasonableness, Habeas Theory, and the
Nature of Legal Rules, 2 BuFF. CRIM. L. REv. 535, 537 (1999) (discussing § 2254(d) (1));
Benjamin Robert Ogletree, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Chapter
154: The Key to the CourthouseDoor or SlaughterhouseJustice?, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 603, 606-07
(1998) (discussing the opt-in sections).
9 See, e.g., Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S.
125 S.Ct. 1432, 1442 (2005) (Breyer,
J., concurring) ("In my view, this is a case in which Congress' instruction to defer to the
reasonable conclusions of state-court judges makes a critical difference."); see also Neal v.
Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 244 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam) (finding that
petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was meritorious, but that § 2254(d)
precluded the court from granting the writ of habeas corpus); Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d
303, 310 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that "whether AEDPA deference applies . . . is all but
outcome-determinative").
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death sentences in the nine post-AEDPA years than it was in the same
period of time prior to AEDPA. While the same claim cannot be
made about the federal courts of appeals, AEDPA has still not
completely gutted habeas corpus.
After discussing these developments, and making the case for the
counterintuitive proposition that AEDPA has been less "bite" than
"hype," i.e., that it has not had the effects its proponents 1°-or for
that matter its detractors"1 (including myself) -envisioned, I will then
tackle the more difficult question: Why? Why, in spite of the AEDPA
hype, has there been so little bite? The answer, or I should say
answers, are certainly subject to debate. Some would say, and I would
agree, that a significant contributing factor is that AEDPA is so poorly
drafted. Justice Souter remarked that "in a world of silk purses and
12
pigs' ears, the Act is not a silk purse of the art of statutory drafting."'
That is an extremely charitable observation. 13 Even Justice Scalia
recently disparaged the statutory language at oral argument in an
AEDPA case involving the meaning of one of the statute of limitations
provisions, asking of one of the attorneys arguing before the Court,
"Who is responsible for writing this?" 14 But poor drafting would be a
simple story, and, as I will discuss, I do not believe this particular story
is quite so simple. Others would argue, and again I agree in part, that
AEDPA's framers chose arcane statutory language, especially for
§ 2254(d), that had no prior habeas history or pedigree. The use of
new statutory language combined with the speed with which Congress
enacted AEDPA left the Supreme Court, and lower federal courts,
with little guidance regarding Congress's intent. 15 That argument
10 See, e.g., William J. Meade, The Demise of De Novo Review in Federal Habeas Corpus
Practice, 85 MASS. L. REv. 127, 132 (2001) ("[AEDPA] marks a great shift towards a system
of federal review which more properly acknowledges the respect and deference state court
decisions are not only owed but deserve.").
11
See, e.g., Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism: A Functional Critique and Proposed
Reconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2002); Bryan A.
Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital FederalHabeas Corpus
Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 699, 702 (2002) ("AEDPA has dramatically altered federal habeas
corpus practice in a number of respects."); Nat Hentoff, Clinton Screws the Bill of Rights,
VILLAGE VOICE (N.Y.), Nov. 5, 1996, at 12 ("[AEDPA] contain[ed] the most draconian
restrictions on habeas corpus since Lincoln suspended the Great Writ [of habeas corpus]
during the Civil War." (third alteration in original)).
12 Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997).
13

Other scholars have noted AEDPA's shoddiness.

See, e.g., LARRY YACKLE, FEDERAL

COURTS: HABEAS Coiu'us 57 (2003) ("AEDPA is notorious for its poor drafting. The Act is
replete with vague and ambiguous language, apparent inconsistency, and plain bad
grammar."); Liebman, supra note 2, at 426 ("AEDPA complicates review.., because of its
poor drafting.").
14 Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Dodd v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2478 (2005)
(No. 04-5286).
15 See Larry Yackle, State Convicts and FederalCourts: Reopening the Habeas Corpus Debate,
91 CORNELL L. REv. 541 (2005).
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also has some force, but again, I do not think it is the complete story.
Finally, some may even argue that the Court narrowly construed
AEDPA in order to avoid any Article III or Suspension Clause
problems with the statute. I find this even less likely, but not wholly
out of the question.
The argument I advance here is that AEDPA's lack of bite is
largely due to the fact that the Supreme Court, in the absence of
congressional habeas reform throughout the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and
1990s, had already significantly curtailed the writ of habeas corpus.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts-but
especially the Supreme Court-believe that it is ultimately up to the
courts, not Congress, to decide how much habeas is "enough." While
the Court maintains that the scope of the writ is primarily for
Congress to determine,' 6 it does not, in my view, really believe that to
be true. At the end of the day, the Court has assumed a fair share of
the responsibility for determining the scope of habeas review, or how
much habeas is enough. However, as I will also argue, the Court has a
very narrow view of the great writ's scope.
I
A

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE HABEAS DEBATE

The debate over the role of federal habeas corpus is an old one.
Scholars, including several of those who participated in this Symposium, have debated the history of federal review of state court convictions, including the question of whether the framers envisioned that
state prisoners would be permitted to seek a writ of habeas corpus in
the federal courts. 1 7 Over the last one hundred years, and especially
since the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Allen' 8 and its three
16 See, e.g., Felkerv. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996) ("[J]udgments about the proper
scope of the writ are 'normally for Congress to make."' (quoting Lonchar v. Thomas, 517
U.S. 314, 323 (1996))); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 499 (1953) (noting that Congress
controls the scope of the writ).
17
See, e.g., WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS (1980);
ERIC M.

FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY (2001); ROB-

ERT S. WALKER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS THE

WRIT OF LIBERTY (1960); YACKLE, supra note 13, at 1-58; Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and
Federal ConstitutionalLitigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605 (1981); Robert M. Cover & T.

Alexander Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035
(1977); Dallin H. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-HabeasCorpus, 64 MICH. L. REV. 451
(1966); Francis Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605. For a detailed discussion of the history of habeas corpus and the debate over the role of habeas
corpus in the United States, see 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 5-107 (4th ed. 2001).
18
344 U.S. 443 (1953). In broad strokes, Brown rejected the notion that the state

court's decision on the merits of a federal constitutional claim was resjudicata. According
to the Court, the state court decision was entitled only to the "weight that federal practice
gives to the conclusion of a court of last resort of another jurisdiction on federal constitu-
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subsequent decisions establishing the highwater mark of habeas a decade later, 9 the debate has intensified. Proponents of broad habeas
review extolled (and extol) the need for every inmate that so desires
to have a federal forum to entertain the merits of her federal constituz0 Of
tional challenges to the underlying conviction and sentence.
course, there were variations on this theme, 21 but the essence of this
approach was (and is) that federal courts should engage, for the most
part, in de novo review of a state prisoner's federal constitutional
claims.2 2 In other words, a state court's resolution of the federal constitutional issue was not entitled to any deference; a federal court determined the issue anew. 23 From at least Brown v. Allen until late in
the twentieth century, that view more or less prevailed.
To habeas detractors, however, federal habeas review of state convictions was anathema.2 4 They felt punishing and controlling crime is
a-if not the--quintessential state function. 25 Having federal courts
effectively sit in judgment over state courts demonstrated contempt
tional issues," id. at 458, and the scope of the federal court's review was de novo, id. at 500
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
19 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1963) (holding that federal courts have the
authority to review claims which were procedurally defaulted in state court); Townsend v.
Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (holding that federal courts can hold evidentiary hearings if state
court fact-finding process was defective); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963) (holding that petitioner can, under a variety of circumstances, file more than one habeas
petition).
20
See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners:An Exercise
in Federalism,7 UTAH L. REv. 423 (1961); Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L.
REV. 247 (1988); Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 579 (1982); Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REv.
2331 (1993).
21
CompareJames S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The AnachronisticAttack on Habeas
Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1997 (1992) (arguing that federal habeas
corpus serves as a surrogate for Supreme Court review), with Larry W. Yackle, Explaining
Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991 (1985) (arguing for a federal forum for federal rights
model of habeas corpus).
22 I say "for the most part" because Brown and other cases recognized that state court
factual findings must be treated as presumptively correct. See, e.g., Brown, 344 U.S. at 506
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). And these factual findings can, in many cases, circumscribe
a federal court's ability to grant habeas corpus relief. See, e.g., Marshall v. Lonberger, 459
U.S. 422, 433 (1983); Buckley v. Terhune, 397 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted,
416 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2005).
23 Brown, 344 U.S. at 508 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[T]he District Judge [must]
decide constitutional questions presented by a State prisoner even after his claims have
been carefully considered by the State courts.").
24 See, e.g., John J. Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1948);
Frank W. Wilson, Federal Habeas Corpus and the State Court CriminalDefendant, 19 VAND. L.
REv. 741 (1966).
25
See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 585 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("Nowhere has a 'proper respect for state functions' been more essential to our
federal system than in the administration of criminal justice. This Court repeatedly has
recognized that criminal law is primarily the business of the States, and that absent the
most extraordinary circumstances the federal courts should not interfere with the States'
administration of that law.").

264
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for the state court system, which in turn created federal-state friction,
disrupted the state's legitimate interest in finality, and undermined
effective law enforcement. 26 Thus, opponents of habeas advocated for
a more hands-off policy.2 7 Again, there were variations in the restrictions habeas opponents would place on a state prisoner's ability to

obtain the great writ (e.g., Professor Bator's "process" model of
habeas;2 Judge Friendly's "innocence model"29 ), but the essence of
these approaches was similar: The role of habeas was crimped and
state court judgments should only be disrupted under extreme
circumstances.

3 0

Federal habeas in the Article III trenches, as opposed to habeas
in the academy, was a more rough-and-tumble affair. The ongoing
habeas debate in practice was driven in large part by the equally vigorous and ongoing debate about capital punishment. 31 Almost all state
death row inmates whose convictions and sentences were affirmed by
the state courts sought (and to this day seek) federal review of their
convictions and death sentences. Thus, after the Supreme Court
ushered in the modern era of capital punishment in 1976,32 the
habeas debate intensified not only in the academy, but also in Congress and the courts. To the anti-habeas camp, death row inmates
used the writ of habeas corpus to cheat (or at least delay) the executioner;3 3 to the pro-habeas contingent, however, searching federal
habeas review was absolutely essential to avoid unjust executions.

26
See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpusfor State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REv. 441 (1963).
27
SeeYACKLE, supra note 13, at 53.
28
See Bator, supra note 26. Professor Bator's process model argues for limiting federal habeas relief to situations in which the petitioner did not receive a full and fair hearing in state court. See id.
29
See HenryJ. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on State CourtJudgments,
38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142 (1970). Judge Friendly argued that habeas was an extraordinary
remedy, and thus federal courts "act as a safety net to catch the few truly innocent people
who have slipped through the cracks." Evan Tsen Lee, The Theories of FederalHabeas Corpus,

72

WASH.

U. L.Q. 151, 153 (1994).

Much of the debate was also driven by differing views as to whether federal courts
are "systematically better than state courts in detecting and correcting errors of federal
law." YACKLE, supra note 13, at 6; see, e.g., Bator, supra note 17, at 622-25; Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the FederalJudiciary,36 UCLA L. REv. 233 (1988);
Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1977).
'"
See, e.g., Larry W. Yackle, Capital Punishment, Federal Courts, and the Writ of Habeas
Corpus, in BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA's DEATH PENALTY 58 (Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003).
32
For a more detailed discussion of this history, see John H. Blume, Twenty-Five Years
offDeath: A Report of the Cornell Death Penalty Projecton the "Modern"Era of CapitalPunishmentin
South Carolina,54 S.C. L. REv. 285 (2002). See also STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALT AN
30

AMERICAN HIsrORy 267-311 (2002).
33
See, e.g., Yackle, supra note 31,

at 59.
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The Court as Habeas "Reformer"

Prior to AEDPA, there had been a number of attempts at habeas
"reform." Many of these efforts were supported by members of the
Supreme Court, the most vocal of which was former Chief Justice
Rehnquist, who had long been an opponent of federal review of state
convictions and death sentences. 34 From his days as Justice Jackson's
law clerk, he continually expressed his disdain for habeas corpus and
35
the intrusion of the writ on the state court criminal justice system.
Spurred on by judicial and academic criticism of the Supreme Court's
perceived expansion of the writ during the highwater-mark era of
Brown v. Allen, Townsend v. Sain, Fay v. Noia, and Sanders v. United
States, and further fueled by condemned prisoners' pesky persistence
in filing multiple habeas corpus petitions, a range of proposed legislative fixes were prepared. The efforts to curb federal habeas varied in
their restrictiveness,3 6 but Congress was never able to muster enough
3 7
votes to pass any of these measures.
Faced with congressional inaction, a majority of the Supreme
Court, led by then-Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell, and Justice
Rehnquist, set out on its own to limit a federal habeas court's ability to
disturb state court convictions.38 This regime of systematic judicial
limitations on federal habeas corpus continued throughout the 19 7 0s,
1980s, and into the 1990s. The Court did not make much of an effort
to hide its agenda, noting in one case that "[i] n light of 'the profound
societal costs that attend the exercise of habeas jurisdiction,' we have
found it necessary to impose significant limits on the discretion of federal courts to grant habeas relief."3 9 Moreover, in another decision,
the Court specifically rejected an argument that Congress's failure to
pass any of the various habeas reform measures amounted to disapproval of the Court's ability to restrict the circumstances under which
34
See Yackle, supra note 20, at 2332 ("Over a career spanning forty years, Chief Justice
Rehnquist has been witness to, or has participated in, numerous efforts to import preclusion into the law of habeas corpus .... ").
a5
See EDWARD P. LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 130-46 (1998).
36
For example, some proposals advocated the total abolition of federal review of state
court convictions. SeeYackle, supra note 20, at 2350 (discussing provision of crime act that
would have overruled Brown v. Allen). Other proposals embraced Professor Bator's process
model or tracked Judge Friendly's innocence model. See id. at 2354-57. Other proposals,
e.g., the Powell Committee report, offered procedural reforms for capital cases. Id. at
2367-68.
-7
For a detailed history of various congressional proposals, see id. at 2337-74.
38
Id. at 2356-57.
39
Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 554-55 (1998) (citation omitted) (quoting
Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 539 (1986)). In Wainwright v. Sykes, the Court acknowledged its "willingness to overturn or modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ, even
where the statutory language authorizing judicial action has remained unchanged." 433
U.S. 72, 81 (1977).
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a federal court could grant the writ. 40 While any detailed discussion
of the Supreme Court's habeas reform decisions is beyond the scope
of this Article, the Rehnquist Court's judicial handiwork included the
following cutbacks on habeas corpus:
" In Stone v. Powell, the Court precluded habeas petitioners from
raising Fourth Amendment claims when the state courts had "pro4
vided an opportunity for full and fair litigation" of the issue. '
* In Wainwright v. Sykes, 4 2 the Court effectively overruled Fay v.
Noia,4 and restricted a federal habeas court's ability to entertain
the merits of an issue that was not properly preserved in state
court proceedings by requiring that the petitioner demonstrate
"cause and prejudice" for the procedural default. 4 4

40
See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 632-33 (1993) (adopting a more stringent
prejudice standard for habeas cases). The Brecht majority stated that it was "reluctant to
draw inferences from Congress' failure to act." Id. at 632 (quotations omitted). The Court
then concluded that "[i] n the absence of any express statutory guidance from Congress, it
remains for this Court to determine what harmless-error standard applies on collateral
review." Id. at 633.
41
428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976) ("[W]here the State has provided an opportunity for full
and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that a
state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial."). Thus, Stone
represents the judicial adoption of Professor Bator's process model, at least for Fourth
Amendment issues. See supra note 28. Justice Brennan's dissent in Stone noted that the
case was "a harbinger of future eviscerations of the habeas statutes that plainly does violence to congressional power to frame the statutory contours of habeas jurisdiction." 428
U.S. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Withrow v. Williams, the Court refused to extend
Stone's rationale to Fifth Amendment violations, specifically claims that police obtained a
confession in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See 507 U.S. 680 (1993).
For a more detailed discussion of Stone, see I HERTZ & LiEBMAN, supra note 17, at 450-56;
YACKLE,

supra note 13, at 60-63.

42

433 U.S. 72 (1977).

43

372 U.S. 391 (1963).

Drawing on several decisions from the prior term, e.g., Francis v. Henderson, 425
U.S. 536 (1976), the Court rejected Fay's deliberate bypass standard as not being sufficiently rigorous to protect the state's comity interest in its contemporaneous objection
rules. See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 87-91. In doing so, Justice Rehnquist referred to "this
Court's historic willingness to overturn or modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ,
even where the statutory language authorizing judicial action has remained unchanged."
Id. at 81. Again,Justice Brennan's dissent argued that the Court's action was inconsistent
with Congress's decision to grant "liberal post-trial federal review." Id. at 106 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). While acknowledging that "some of [his] Brethren may feel uncomfortable
with this congressional choice of policy,"Justice Brennan nevertheless contended that such
a decision was still Congress's alone to make. Id. at 105. For a more detailed discussion of
the procedural default doctrine, see 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 17, at 1133-277;
YACKLE, supra note 13, at 192-226. See atsoJohn H. Blume & David P. Voisin, An Introduction to Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, 47 S.C. L. REV. 271, 286-90 (1996)
(describing possible effects of state procedural default); John H. Blume & Pamela A. Wilkins, Death by Default: State ProceduralDefault Doctrine in Capital Cases, 50 S.C. L. REv. 1
(1998) (describing procedural default rules of South Carolina and their application in
capital cases).
44
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" In Sumner v. Mata, the Court expanded the circumstances under
which the presumption of correctness afforded to state courts'
45
factual findings is applicable.
" In Rose v. Lundy, the Court adopted a "total exhaustion" rule precluding federal courts, in most instances, from adjudicating
"mixed" habeas petitions, such as those containing both ex46
hausted and unexhausted claims.
"

In Barefoot v. Estelle, the Court approved the use of expedited review procedures in capital habeas appeals. 47 The Court also held
that a death-sentenced inmate must make "a 'substantial showing
of the denial of [a] federal right"' before being granted leave to
48
pursue such an appeal.

* In Teague v. Lane, the Court crafted a nonretroactivity doctrine
that prevents federal courts, except in the rarest of cases, from
granting the writ of habeas corpus if doing so would require the
49
creation or application of a new rule of criminal procedure.

45
449 U.S. 539 (1981). In Mata, the Court held that the presumption applies even to
state appellate court fact-findings. Id. at 546-47. For a more detailed discussion of the
presumption of correctness doctrine, see 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 17, at 822-33;
YACKLE, supra note 13, at 228-33. See also Blume & Voisin, supra note 44, at 296-98 (discussing when federal courts should presume that state court findings are correct).
46
455 U.S. 509 (1982) (plurality opinion). The Court noted that "[t]he exhaustion
doctrine is principally designed to protect the state courts' role in the enforcement of
federal law and prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings." Id. at 518. The Court
went on to say that "[a] rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule will encourage state
prisoners to seek full relief first from the state courts, thus giving those courts the first
opportunity to review all claims of constitutional error." Id. at 518-19.
47
463 U.S. 880, 894 (1983). The Court stated:
When the process of direct review ... comes to an end, a presumption of
finality and legality attaches to the conviction and sentence. The role of
federal habeas proceedings, while important in assuring that constitutional
rights are observed, is secondary and limited. Federal courts are not forums in which to relitigate state trials. Even less is federal habeas a means
by which a defendant is entitled to delay an execution indefinitely.
Id. at 887.
48
Id. at 893 (alteration in original) (quoting Stewart v. Beto, 454 F.2d 268, 270 n.2
(5th Cir. 1971)).
49
489 U.S. 288 (1989). As the Court explained, "Unless they fall within an exception
to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to
those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced." Id. at 310.
According to the Court, "The 'new rule' principle therefore validates reasonable, goodfaith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are
shown to be contrary to later decisions." Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990).
Justice Brennan, again in dissent, maintained that the Court was stripping prisoners of
"virtually any meaningful federal review of the constitutionality of their incarceration." Id.
at 417 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He also stated that "the Court has finally succeeded in its
thinly veiled crusade to eviscerate Congress' habeas corpus regime." Id. at 418. For a more
detailed discussion of Teague, see 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 17, at 1025-1132; YACKLE,
supra note 13, at 69-94; John Blume & William Pratt, The ChangingFace of Retroactivity, 58
UMKC L. REV. 581 (1990);John Blume & William Pratt, UnderstandingTeague v. Lane, 18
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1991); Blume & Voisin, supra note 44, at 292-94.

268

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:259

" In McCleskey v. Zant, the Court placed significant restrictions on a
federal court's ability to entertain a second or subsequent federal
50
petition.
* In Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, the Court limited the circumstances
under which a federal court could conduct an evidentiary
51
hearing.
" In Duncan v. Henry, the Court heightened pleading requirements
remedies to preso that a habeas petitioner must exhaust all state
52
serve a claim for subsequent federal review.
* In Brecht v. Abrahamson, the Court adopted a more stringent
harmless error standard for federal courts to use in determining
error requires that the writ
whether the presence of constitutional
53
of habeas corpus be granted.
499 U.S. 467 (1991). Normal principles of resjudicata historically did not apply in
habeas corpus. Ajudicially crafted doctrine known as "abuse of the writ" developed. See id.
at 479-89; Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963). In McCleskey, the Court held that a
federal court should dismiss a second federal petition unless the petitioner could demonstrate cause and prejudice for failing to include the claim in the first federal petition. 499
U.S. at 493. In his dissent, Justice Marshall argued that the majority's "doctrinal innovation . . . repudiates a line of judicial decisions codified by Congress in the governing statute." Id. at 506 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a more detailed discussion of the abuse of
the writ doctrine, see 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 17, at 1264-75; YACKLE, supra note 13,
at 250-54; Blume & Voisin, supra note 44, at 294-95.
51
504 U.S. 1 (1992). The Court, overruling in part Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293
(1963), adopted the "cause-and-prejudice" standard used in the procedural default context. Id. at 8 ("As in cases of state procedural default, application of the cause-andprejudice standard to excuse a state prisoner's failure to develop material facts in state
court will appropriately accommodate concerns of finality, comity, judicial economy, and
channeling the resolution of claims into the most appropriate forum."). Justice O'Connor,
in her dissenting opinion, maintained that the Court's decision could not be reconciled
with 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), "a statute Congress enacted three years after Townsend" Id. at 12
(0' Connor, J., dissenting). For a more detailed discussion of Keeney, see 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 17, at 803-06; Blume & Voisin, supra note 44, at 298-301.
52
513 U.S. 364 (1995) (per curiam). In his dissent, Justice Stevens observed that the
Court's opinion "creates an exacting pleading requirement that serves no legitimate purpose in our habeas corpus jurisprudence." Id. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53
507 U.S. 619 (1993). The Court rejected the traditional harmless-error standard
for constitutional claims established in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), which
required the prosecution to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not
contribute to the verdict. Instead, it adopted a test requiring that the petitioner establish
that the error had "'substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's
verdict.'" Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776
(1946)). The majority rejected the habeas petitioner's argument that "Congress' failure to
enact various proposals since Chapman was decided ... amounts to legislative disapproval
of application of a less stringent harmless-error standard on collateral review of constitutional error." Id. at 632. Rather, the majority concluded "it remains for this Court to
determine what harmless-error standard applies on collateral review." Id. at 633. In his
dissenting opinion, Justice White believed the majority's decision was "at odds with the role
Congress has ascribed to habeas review, which is, at least in part, to deter both prosecutors
and courts from disregarding their constitutional responsibilities." Id. at 648 (White, J.,
dissenting). For a more detailed discussion of Brecht, see 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note
17, at 1365-78; YACKLE, supra note 13, at 63-66; John H. Blume & Stephen P. Garvey,
HarmlessErrorin FederalHabeas Corpus After Brecht v. Abrahamson, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv.
163 (1993).
50
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In each of these decisions, the majority focused on the interests
of comity, federalism, and finality5 4-interests it believed prior habeas
jurisprudence had significantly undervalued. 55 When the Court considered those interests, the "profound social costs that attend the exercise of habeas jurisdiction" 56 were apparent. These costs, as well as
the "heavy burden" that federal habeas places on "scarce judicial resources," 57 supported the Court's systematic campaign to "impose significant limits on the discretion of federal courts to grant habeas
58
relief."
In numerous cases decided between 1976 and 1996, the Court
applied and tightened the judicial habeas reform measures described
above. 59 Particularly in the procedural default and Teague new rule
context, a majority of the Court embraced draconian applications of
the procedural default doctrine 60 and definitions of new and old
rules, 61 which made it very difficult for habeas petitioners to prevail.
54
See, e.g., Brecht, 507 U.S. at 635 ("The reason most frequently advanced in our cases
for distinguishing between direct and collateral review is the State's interest in the finality
of convictions that have survived direct review within the state court system. We have also
spoken of comity and federalism." (citations omitted)); Keeney, 504 U.S. at 7 ("The writ
strikes at finality of a state criminal conviction, a matter of critical importance in a federal
system."); McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 491 ("Finality has special importance in the context of a
federal attack on a state conviction.... Our federal system recognizes the independent
power of a State to articulate societal norms through criminal law; but the power of a State
to pass laws means little if the State cannot enforce them." (citations omitted)); Teague, 489
U.S. at 308 (" '[TI he Court never has defined the scope of the writ simply by reference to a
perceived need to assure that an individual accused of crime is afforded a trial free of
constitutional error.' Rather, we have recognized that interests of comity and finality must
also be considered in determining the proper scope of habeas review." (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 447 (1986) (plurality
opinion)).
55
See, e.g.,
Keeney, 504 U.S. at 7 ("Again addressing the issue of state procedural default in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), we described Fay [v. Noia] as based on a
conception of federal/state relations that undervalued the importance of state procedural
rules ....").
56
Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 539 (1986); see McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 490-91 ("The
doctrines of procedural default and abuse of the writ implicate nearly identical concerns
flowing from the significant costs of federal habeas corpus review.").
57
Keeney, 504 U.S. at 7.
58
Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 554-55 (1998).
59
See, e.g.,
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (plurality opinion) (establishing
a rigorous factual innocence standard which a habeas petitioner must meet in order to
satisfy the miscarriage ofjustice exception excusing state procedural defaults); Wainwright
v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (establishing that juror impartiality is a question of fact subject
to the presumption of correctness); Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111 (1983) (per curiam)
(holding that competency to stand trial is a question of fact subject to the presumption of
correctness).
60
See, e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 722 (holding that all claims raised by a death-sentenced inmate were procedurally barred, because his attorney filed a notice of appeal less
than a week late).
61
See, e.g., Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383 (1994) (finding petitioner's claim to be
Teague-barred); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333 (1993) (same); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S.
461 (1993) (same); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990) (same); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S.
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Thus, by the time Congress finally passed habeas "reform" legislation,
something it in all likelihood, could not have achieved without the
help of Timothy McVeigh, 62 the Supreme Court had dramatically reshaped the writ of habeas corpus.
II
AN AEDPA OVERVIEW

AEDPA's habeas reform provisions have been discussed in detail
in the legal literature and I will not replow that ground. 63 For contextual purposes, however, a quick look at several of AEDPA's provisions
is necessary. In broad strokes, AEDPA did the following:
* Created a statute of limitations for habeas corpus cases. 64 Prior to
AEDPA, there was no set time limit on a habeas petitioner's ability
to seek federal review of his state conviction or sentence. AEDPA
contains a one-year statute of limitations with various tolling provisions. 65 In most cases, the limitations period commences on the
date the Supreme Court denies certiorari following direct
66
appeal.
* Placed extremely stringent restrictions on a habeas petitioner's
ability to file a second (or subsequent) habeas petition. Federal
67
courts must dismiss any claim raised in a previous petition.
Claims not previously raised are subject to dismissal unless the
petitioner is able to demonstrate either that the claim relies on a
new retroactive legal rule, or that new facts have been discovered
(which could not have been discovered previously), and that
these facts establish by clear and convincing evidence that no rea68
It
sonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty.
407 (1990) (finding petitioner's claim to be Teague-barred and establishing that a rule was
new for Teague purposes if it was not dictated by precedent that existed at the time the
petitioner's conviction was final).
62
See Kenneth Williams, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: What's Wrong
with It and How To Fix It, 33 CONN. L. REv. 919, 923 (2001); see also Liebman, supra note 2,
at 413 ("AEDPA, thus, was the product of the bizarre alignment of three ill-starred events:
Timothy McVeigh's twisted patriotism and disdain for 'collateral damage,' the Gingrich
Revolution in its heyday, and the Clinton Presidency at the furthest point of its most rightward triangulation.").
63
See, e.g.,
Stephen B. Bright, Is Fairness Irrelevant?: The Evisceration of Federal Habeas
Corpus Review and Limits on the Ability of State Court To ProtectFundamentalRights, 54 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 1 (1997); Marshall J. Hartman & Jeanette Nyden, Habeas Corpus and the New
Federalism After the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 J. MARSHALL L.
REv. 337 (1997); Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of the New Habeas Statute: An (Opinionated)
User's Manual, 51 VAND. L. R~v. 103 (1998); Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas
Corpus Statute, 44 Bur. L. REv. 381 (1996). For a comprehensive discussion of AEDPA's
provisions, see 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 17, at 109-215.
64 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000).
65
Id.
66 See id.§ 2244(d)(1) (A).
67 See id. § 2244(b)(1).
68 Id.§ 2244(b) (2)(A), (B)(i)-(ii).
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also made the court of appeals, as opposed to the district court,
the gatekeeper for determining whether a second petition may be
69
submitted.
* Regulated the circumstances under which a federal district court
is permitted to convene an evidentiary hearing in cases where the
petitioner fails to take advantage of state court fact-development
opportunities.

70

* Altered in several respects the exhaustion of state remedies
7
requirement. '
72
* Modified preexisting law regulating appeals in habeas matters.
But, the two big ticket items were:
" A new chapter, Chapter 154, which created a new set of proce73
dures for capital cases in opt-in jurisdictions.
" A new section, § 2254(d), which limited the circumstances under
74
which a federal court can grant the writ of habeas CorpuS.
I will discuss these two provisions in more detail.
A.

The Opt-In Provisions

Chapter 154 of AEDPA provides a number of procedural advantages to qualifying states in federal habeas proceedings. 75 Colloquially, these states are referred to as opt-in jurisdictions. Chapter 154's
provisions are applicable to states that provide both a "mechanism for
the appointment, compensation, and payment of reasonable litigation
expenses of competent counsel in State post-conviction proceedings
brought by indigent prisoners whose capital convictions and sentences
have been upheld on direct appeal" 76 and "standards of competency
77
for the appointment of such counsel."
69
70

Id. § 2244(b) (3).
See id. § 2254(e)(2).

77

Id.

If the habeas petitioner is at fault for failing to develop the
facts in state court, then a federal court can conduct an evidentiary hearing only if the
claim relies on a new retroactive rule of law, or if the facts could not have been discovered
earlier and those facts make a clear and convincing showing of actual innocence. See id.
71 See id. § 2254(b) (2)-(3) (permitting a federal court to deny an unexhausted claim
on the merits, and requiring any waiver of the exhaustion of state remedies defense to be
express).
72
See id.§ 2253. This section primarily codified existing law. See Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 475 (2000). The only change was that it required a court issuing a certificate
of appealability to indicate the specific issue or issues regarding which the "applicant has
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2)
(2000).
73 See id. §§ 2261-66.
74 See id.§ 2254(d)(1)-(2).
75 See Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 742 (1998).
76
28 U.S.C. § 2261(b) (2000).
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AEDPA provides opt-in states with a shorter statute of limitations
period: 180 days as opposed to one year. 78 It treats an untimely filed
petition as a second habeas petition, 79 and only permits a petitioner to
amend a habeas petition after a response is filed if the prisoner can
meet the rigorous standards for a second or successive petition.8° In
most circumstances, Chapter 154 prevents a federal court from reviewing a claim that the state courts found to be procedurally defaulted.8 '
Finally, the opt-in provisions require the lower federal courts to decide habeas cases under relatively tight timelines: A federal district
court must issue a final judgment in a habeas case within 180 days of
the petition being filed,8 2 and the court of appeals must decide the
83
case on appeal within 120 days of the briefs being filed.
B.

Section 2254(d)

Section 2254(d), which, most agree, was the centerpiece of
AEDPA,8 4 provides as follows:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits
in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
85
the State court proceeding.
This statutory language had no habeas pedigree; for example, it was
not taken from any Supreme Court decision, like other AEDPA provisions, nor was it part of any previous habeas reform proposal offered
78
Id. § 2263(a) ("Any application under this chapter for habeas corpus relief under
section 2254 must be filed in the appropriate district court not later than 180 days after
final State court affirmance of the conviction and sentence on direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review."). This limitations period also has different, less
generous tolling provisions. See id.§ 2263(b).
79 Id.§ 2262(c).
80
See id.§§ 2244(b), 2266(b) (3) (B).
81
See id. § 2264(a) ("[T]he district court shall only consider a claim or claims that
have been raised and decided on the merits in the State courts, unless the failure to raise
the claim properly is ...the result of [unconstitutional] State action[,] ...[a new retroactive rule of law,] or based on [facts] that could not have been [previously]
discovered ....").
82
See id.§ 2266(b) (1)(A).
83
Id. § 2266(c)(1)(A). It does not shorten the Supreme Court's time to decide
whether or not to grant certiorari following the court of appeals' decision in a capital
habeas case.
84
See, e.g., YACKLE, supra note 13, at 95; Scheidegger, supra note 7, at 945.
85
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000).
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by Congress or a habeas scholar. The floor debates and the perfunctory conference report on AEDPA are also unilluminating regarding
§ 2254(d)'s intent.8 6 Thus, for the most part, the federal courts were
forced to divine its meaning from scratch.
The Supreme Court, remarkably, has said little about
how § 2254(d) works beyond that it limits a federal court's power to
grant relief.87 And the Court has also said little about how § 2254(d)
fits in with prior judge-made habeas doctrines, e.g., the Teague doctrine.8 8 For the most part, the Court has gravitated towards talismanic
characterizations of § 2254(d) (1) 's "contrary to" and "unreasonable
application" clauses, while remaining virtually silent about
§ 2254(d) (2). The following passage is indicative of the Court's current formulation:
86

See Yackle, supra note 63, at 398-401.

87

See Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S.

_,

_

, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 1439 (2005) (stating that

§ 2254(d)'s "conditions for the grant of federal habeas relief have not been established");
Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S.

_,

_

, 125 S. Ct. 847, 851 (2005) (per curiam) ("A federal court

may grant a writ of habeas corpus based on a claim adjudicated by a state court if the statecourt decision was 'contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" (quoting
§ 2254(d) (1))); Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) ("Relief may not be granted
unless the state court adjudication 'resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."' (quoting § 2254(d) (1))); Middleton v. McNeil, 541
U.S. 433, 436 (2004) (per curiam) ("A federal court may grant habeas relief to a state
prisoner if a state court's adjudication of his constitutional claim was 'contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal Law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States.'" (quoting § 2254(d) (1))); Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003) ("Statutes such as AEDPA have placed more, rather than fewer,
restrictions on the power of federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners."); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002) ("Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals exceeded its statutory authority to grant relief under § 2254(d)(I) .... ); Felker v.
Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 662 (1996) ("Our authority to grant habeas relief to state prisoners is
limited by § 2254, which specifies the conditions under which such relief may be
granted ....
").The Court also refers at times to § 2254(d) as a "deference" provision. See,
e.g.,
Middleton, 541 U.S. at 437 ("This conclusion failed to give appropriate deference to the
state court's decision."); Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997) (stating that
§ 2254(d) dictates a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings"). However, the word "deference" does not appear anywhere in AEDPA. Scholars have discussed
the constitutional problems with requiring federal courts to defer to state court interpretations of the Federal Constitution. SeeJames S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual
Power": The Quantity and Quality of DecisionmakingRequired of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 696 (1998); Scheidegger, supra note 7.
88 What the Court has said makes little sense. For example, in Horn v. Banks, the
Court held that if the state raises nonretroactivity as a defense, then a federal court should
consider at the outset whether the habeas petitioner is seeking the benefit of a new rule.
536 U.S. 266, 271 (2002) (per curiam). Assuming the petitioner does not need the benefit
of a new rule, the Court would then determine whether relief is foreclosed by § 2254(d).
However, the Court made no attempt to explain how this would work in practice. For
instance, could a claim not depend on a new rule for Teague purposes, but nonetheless be
barred because it was not based on "clearly established federal law"?
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A state-court decision is contrary to this Court's clearly established
precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set
forth in our cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially
indistinguishable from a decision of this Court but reaches a different result. A state-court decision involves an unreasonable application of this Court's clearly established precedents if the state court
applies this Court's precedents to the facts in an objectively unreasonable manner. 89
There are a number of interpretive questions that are currently
percolating in the lower federal courts. By and large, however, the
Court has not yet resolved many of the thornier questions. I will return to some of these issues in Part V.
III
HAS AEDPA MADE A DIFFERENCE?

A.

The "Hype"

In this section, I contend that AEDPA has not had the far reaching effects that many predicted. As will be discussed in detail below,
two of AEDPA's key provisions-§ 2254(d) and Chapter 154-have
not had the profound effect many initially predicted.
The Chapter 154 case is the easier one to make and I begin there.
More than nine years after AEDPA's enactment, not a single jurisdiction has successfully opted in. 90 Some states do not even argue that
they can satisfy Chapter 154's demands. 91 Other jurisdictions have as89 Brown, 544 U.S. at _ ,125 S.Ct. at 1438-39 (citations omitted); see Rompilla v.
Beard, 545 U.S _
__. 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2462 (2005) ("An 'unreasonable application'
occurs when a state court 'identifies the correct governing legal principle from this
Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts' of petitioner's case."
(quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003))); Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640
(2003) ("[A] decision by a state court is 'contrary to' our clearly established law if it 'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases' or if it 'confronts a set
of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless
arrives at a result different from our precedent."' (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 405-06 (2000))); Bell, 535 U.S. at 694 ("A federal habeas court may issue the writ
under the 'contrary to' clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing
law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we have done on a set of
materially indistinguishable facts. The court may grant relief under the 'unreasonable application' clause if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from
our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case. The focus of
the latter inquiry is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal
law is objectively unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams that an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." (citations omitted)).
90 See Celestine Richards McConville, The Right to Effective Assistance of CapitalPostconviction Counsel: ConstitutionalImplications of Statutory Grants of Capital Counsel, 2003 Wis. L.
REv. 31, 62-63.
91 See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Nagle, 58 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1335 n.26 (N.D. Ala. 1999) (Alabama does not assert that it meets the opt-in requirements.); Noel v. Norris, 194 F. Supp.
2d 893, 923 (E.D. Ark. 2002) (Arkansas concedes that it fails to meet the opt-in requirements.); Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1131 n.58 (11th Cir. 2000) (Georgia does not

2006]

AEDPA: THE "HYPE"AND THE "BITE"

serted that they do qualify, but courts have disagreed. 9 2 Several states
are still trying. 93 Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that the "special"
procedures for capital cases have been much ado about very little, and
unless something changes dramatically, these special procedures for
94
capital cases appear to be a candidate for the habeas history books.
Then, the following question naturally arises: If AEDPA gives
states with the death penalty these many advantages, why have more
states not opted in? To properly entertain that question, one must
look at the other side of the quid pro quo equation. To qualify, the
state must provide "a mechanism for the appointment, compensation,
and payment of reasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel
in State post-conviction proceedings."9 5 In addition, the state scheme
must provide competency standards for appointed counsel in state
postconviction proceedings, and it must affirmatively offer counsel to
all death-sentenced inmates.9 6 Few states are willing to provide meaningful compensation to qualified counsel in capital cases at trial,
assert that it meets the opt-in requirements.); Leavitt v. Arave, 927 F. Supp. 394, 396 (D.
Idaho 1996) (Idaho makes no claim that it meets the opt-in requirements.); Burris v.
Parke, 95 F.3d 465, 466 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Indiana concedes that it fails to meet
the opt-in requirements.); Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768, 776 (10th Cir. 1998)
(Oklahoma does not assert that it meets the opt-in requirements.).
92
See, e.g., Ashmus v. Woodford, 202 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2000) (California fails to
meet the opt-in requirements.); Hill v. Butterworth, 170 F.R.D. 509 (N.D. Fla. 1997) (Florida fails to meet the opt-in requirements.); Williams v. Cain, 942 F. Supp. 1088, 1092 (W.D.
La. 1996), rev'd in part on other grounds, 125 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1997) (Louisiana fails to meet
the opt-in requirements.); Baker v. Corcoran, 220 F.3d 276, 284-87 (4th Cir. 2000) (Maryland fails to meet the opt-in requirements.); Grayson v. Epps, 338 F. Supp. 2d 699 (S.D.
Miss. 2004) (Mississippi fails to meet the opt-in requirements.); Hall v. Luebbers, 341 F.3d
706, 711-12 (8th Cir. 2003) (Missouri fails to meet the opt-in requirements.); Ryan v.Hopkins, No. 4:CV95-3391, 1996 WL 539220, at *3-4 (D. Neb. July 31, 1996) (Nebraska fails to
meet the opt-in requirements.); Smith v. Anderson, 104 F. Supp. 2d 773, 786 (S.D. Ohio
2000) (Ohio fails to meet the opt-in requirements.), affd sub nom. Smith v. Mitchell, 348
F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 2003); Tucker v. Moore, 56 F. Supp. 2d 611, 614 (D.S.C. 1999) (South
Carolina did not meet the opt-in requirements in the particular case before the court.),
affd sub nom. Tucker v. Catoe, 221 F.3d 600 (4th Cir. 2000); Austin v. Bell, 927 F. Supp.
1058, 1061-62 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (Tennessee fails to meet the opt-in requirements.);
Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 413 n.3 (5th Cir. 1997) (Texas fails to meet the opt-in
requirements.); Tillman v. Cook, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1253 (D. Utah 1998) (adopting
report and recommendation of magistrate) (Utah fails to meet the opt-in requirements.);
Kasi v. Angelone, 200 F. Supp. 2d 585, 592 n.2 (E.D. Va. 2002) (Virginia fails to meet the
opt-in requirements.).
93
For example, the Ninth Circuit held in 2002 that Arizona meets the opt-in requirements, but, in the same case, the court held that Arizona was not "entitled to enforce the
procedures of Chapter 154 in this case, because it did not comply with the timeliness requirements of its own system with respect to Petitioner." Spears v. Stewart, 283 F.3d 992,
1007 (9th Cir. 2002).
94
However, several bills are currently pending in Congress that would require federal
courts to decide capital habeas cases under timelines similar to those found in Chapter 154
regardless of whether the state was an opt-in jurisdiction,' See, e.g., The Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, H.R. 3035, S. 1088, 109th Cong. (2005).
95
28 U.S.C. § 2261(b) (2000).
96
See id.

276

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:259

much less in state postconviction proceedings. 9 7 The reasons for this
are complex and beyond the scope of this Article, 98 but, for the most
part, it is the states' refusal to pay the AEDPA freight that renders
Chapter 154 powerless. 99
As for § 2254(d), it too has had a relatively modest impact on a
habeas petitioner's ability to obtain habeas corpus relief. Let me
make a limited empirical argument for this assertion.10 0 For the purposes of this Article, I reviewed federal habeas corpus cases decided by
the Supreme Court from 1990 through the end of the Court's last
Term. 0 1 I chose 1990 because, by then, almost all of the key components of the Court's judicial habeas reform described in Part II were
97 There is, at present, no constitutional right to counsel in postconviction proceedings, even for death-sentenced inmates. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion). In Georgia, for example, counsel in state habeas corpus proceedings are
not compensated at all; nor do counsel receive any funds for investigative and expert services. One death-sentenced inmate, Exzavious Gibson, was forced to represent himself in
the state collateral review process. See Gibson v. Turpin, 513 S.E.2d 186 (Ga. 1998); see
Sandy Hodson, Appeal Hinges on Evidence: Death Row Inmate Exzavious Gibson, Who Stood Without Lawyer in Earlier Trials, Disputes Sentence, AUGUSTA CHRONICLE (Ga.), Aug. 20, 2000, at
BI. In other states, e.g., Alabama, compensation for appointed counsel in postconviction
proceedings is so minimal that the representation is essentially pro bono. See ALA. CODE
§ 15-12-23(d) (placing a $1000 cap on compensation in capital postconviction proceedings). Even in states where counsel are compensated, the quality of representation in state
postconviction proceedings is often abysmal. See, e.g., TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE, LETHAL
INDIFFERENCE: THE FATAL COMBINATION OF INCOMPETENT ATTORNEYS AND UNACCOUNTABLE
COURTS IN TEXAS DEATH PENALTY APPEALS Xi (2002),
available at http://

www.texasdefender.org/execsum.pdf (concluding that the attorneys appointed for condemned inmates in state postconviction proceedings are "unqualified, irresponsible, or
overburdened and do little if any meaningful work for the client"); see also Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (holding that a Virginia death-sentenced inmate forfeited
all federal constitutional claims because his appointed state postconviction counsel filed a
notice of appeal one day late).
98

For example, it may simply be that in difficult fiscal times, indigent defense is the

first casualty. However, it may also be the case that some jurisdictions have done a cost-

benefit analysis and determined that Chapter 154's advantages do notjustify its cost. Most
of AEDPA's provisions apply to all cases, and the slightly shorter statute of limitations,
limits on amendments, and its timelines may not be enough of a carrot to induce states to
provide qualified, adequately financed counsel.
99 For this reason, the provisions of the Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005 (SPA), see
supra note 94, which establish timelines for the disposition of capital habeas cases regardless of whether the states provide qualified or adequately compensated counsel, or counsel
at all for that matter, are misguided. Having failed to satisfy AEDPA's rather modest standards, the SPA would eliminate any incentives for states to provide competent counsel with
adequate resources to adequately develop the factual and legal bases for viable postconviction claims. Hence, in many of the cases, additional investigation and evidentiary hearings
will be required.
100 There has been no previous empirical analysis of AEDPA's effect on habeas corpus
litigation. There have, however, been empirical studies of other legislation enacted the
same year as AEDPA that was intended to limit prisoner civil rights suits. See Margo
Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1555 (2003).
101
Appendix A contains a chart listing all Supreme Court habeas cases from 1990
through the end of the present Supreme Court Term.
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operative. My examination of the cases revealed a remarkably stable
picture.
The Court decided 63 pre-AEDPA habeas cases. The habeas petitioner-the inmate-was successful in 21 (33%) of those cases. There
were 41 Supreme Court decisions that were governed by AEDPA. The
habeas petitioner was successful in 14 (34%) of the post-Act decisions.
Thus a habeas petitioner's overall success rate did not significantly
change after AEDPA came into effect. The same composite holds
true if only cases involving death-sentenced inmates are considered.
During the same period, 38 (59%) of the Court's pre-AEDPA federal
habeas cases involved death-sentenced inmates; in the post-AEDPA regime, 24 (58%) of the Court's habeas corpus decisions fell into this
category. Thus, the relative distribution of capital to noncapital
habeas cases remained essentially the same.
More importantly, a death-sentenced inmate's success rate also
remained constant. In the pre-Act cases, the habeas petitioner prevailed 15 times (39%), and in cases governed by AEDPA the habeas
petitioner prevailed 9 times (38%). Table 1 captures these data.
TABLE

1.

PRE-ACT/POST-ACT SUPREME COURT HABEAS CASE

COMPARISON

Case Category
Pre-Act/All Habeas Cases
Post-Act/All Habeas Cases
Pre-Act/Capital Habeas Cases
Post-Act/Capital Habeas Cases

1990-2005
Petitioner's Success Rate'
33%
34%
39%
38%

Source: Appendix
a The difference in the petitioner's success rate Pre-Act and Post-Act in all habeas cases (P =
.932) and Pre-Act and Post-Act in capital habeas cases (P = .876) is not statistically
significant.

Among the cases in which the Court actually decided the merits
of the habeas petitioner's underlying claim, habeas petitioners have, if
anything, been slightly more successful in the post-AEDPA cases. For
purposes of this analysis, I divided the cases into two categories: procedural and substantive. I classified a case as procedural if the Court did
not dispose of the merits of the petitioner's constitutional claims. For
example, if the Court announced a rule and then remanded the case
to the court of appeals for further consideration of the claim in light
of that rule,10 2 I deemed the case to be procedural. On the other
102 E.g., Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (holding that the court of appeals
erred in refusing to grant the habeas petitioner a certificate of appealability in connection
with his Batson claim and remanding the case to the court of appeals to consider the merits
of the issue).
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hand, if the Court issued a ruling that disposed of the petitioner's
underlying constitutional
10 4
substantive.

claim, 10

3

I

classified

the

case

as

This analysis also demonstrated a relatively stable situation. In
both the pre- and post-AEDPA cases, there were slightly more substantive than procedural dispositions (54% and 58%, respectively). In the
procedural cases, the habeas petitioner was successful in 15 of 28
(54%) of the pre-AEDPA cases, and 9 of 17 (53%) of the post-Act
decisions. As for substantive rulings, the habeas petitioner prevailed
in 6 of 35 (17%) pre-AEDPA decisions, and in 5 of 24 (21%) of the
cases controlled by AEDPA. Thus, the percentage of cases in which
the inmate prevailed on procedural grounds decreased a bit in the
post-AEDPA cases, but his chances of winning on the merits went up
slightly. Moreover, if one just looks at the capital habeas cases, the
world also did not change dramatically. In the pre-AEDPA habeas
cases involving death-sentenced inmates, the habeas petitioner was
successful in 10 of 14 (71%) procedural decisions, and in AEDPA capital habeas cases the petitioner prevailed in 4 of 6 (67%) procedural
cases. When the substantive rulings are considered, a death row petitioner's success rate was 21% (5 of 24 decisions) in the cases not controlled by the Act, and 28% (5 of 18 cases) in the cases where the
Court was constrained by AEDPA. Table 2 reflects this information.
Finally, as set forth below in Table 3, in both pre- and post-Act
cases, the Court generally tended to grant review in cases from the
103
E.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (holding that the petitioner was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel
failed to discover and present mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of the
proceedings).
104
Admittedly, dividing cases into broad categories such as substantive or procedural
is necessarily imprecise. For example, in some of the procedural cases, while the Court
announced a rule and remanded the case for further consideration, the outcome was often
a foregone conclusion given the nature of the Supreme Court's ruling. See, e.g., Stringer v.
Black, 503 U.S. 222, 237 (1992) (holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that
petitioner's challenge to Mississippi's "heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravating circumstance was Teagutebarred and remanding for further consideration). And, in a few cases, it
is difficult to categorize the Court's ruling. In Gonzalez v. Crosby, for example, the Court
was faced with the question whether Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), which under certain circumstances permits a federal court to reopen a judgment, was available to habeas petitioners.
545 U.S....
, 125 S. Ct. 2641, 2644 (2005). The court of appeals determined that the
petitioner's 60(b) motion was, in fact, a second or successive habeas petition subject to
dismissal under § 2244(b). Id. at 2645. The Supreme Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit's
recharacterization of petitioner's motion, but nonetheless affirmed the denial of petitioner's 60(b) motion because petitioner had not presented evidence of extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify reopening the prior judgment finding the habeas petition
to be untimely. Id. at 2650-51. For purposes of this study, I determined that the decision
was procedural. An additional caveat has to do with the big picture; the story behind any
case is often more complicated since the Supreme Court's decisions, in addition to deciding the individual case, establish rules that are applicable to future cases. Thus "winners
can be losers" and visa versa.
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TABLE

SUBSTANTIVE/PROCEDURAL CASE COMPARISON

Petitioner's Success Rate

Case Category
Pre-Act/Procedural (All)
Post-Act/Procedural (All)
Pre-Act/Substantive (All)
Post-Act/Substantive (All)
Pre-Act/Procedural (Capital)
Post-Act/Procedural (Capital)
Pre-Act/Substantive (Capital)
Post-Act/Substantive (Capital)

54%

53%a

17% b

21 %
71%

67%c

21%
28%d

Source: Appendix.
a The difference in petitioners' success rates Pre-Act and Post-Act in all procedural cases is
not statistically significant (P = .967).

b The difference in petitioners' success rates Pre-Act and Post-Act in all substantive cases is

not statistically significant (P = .721).
' The difference in petitioners' success rates Pre-Act and Post-Act in all capital procedural
cases is not statistically significant (P = .831).
d The difference in petitioners' success rates Pre-Act and Post-Act in all capital substantive
cases is not statistically significant (P = .601).
TABLE

3.

CIRCUIT DISTRIBUTION OF CASES REVIEWED
BY THE SUPREME COURT

Pre-AEDPA
1st
2nd
0

1

Post-AEDPA
1st
2nd
0

2

3rd

4th

5th

6th

7th

8th

9th

10th

11th

1

8

10

5

6

7

16

2

7

3rd

4th

5th

6th

7th

8th

9th

10th

11th

4

7

6

5

1

0

14

1

1

Source: Appendix.

same courts of appeals. More than half of the cases heard by the
Court originated from the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits: 59% (34
of 64 cases) of the pre-Act habeas cases involved the review of decisions from these circuits and 66% (27 of 41 cases) of the post-Act cases
were from these circuits.
In examining the Supreme Court's decisions, several other points
are worth making. One has to do with the Court's treatment of arguments that a death-sentenced inmate was denied the right to the effective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of his trial. In
the pre-AEDPA regime, the Supreme Court had never held that an
attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard
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the Court established in Strickland v. Washington.'0 5 Nor had the
Court found, in the habeas context, that a prosecutor exercised his
peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner under the
Court's 1986 decision in Batson v. Kentucky. 10 6 Under AEDPA, however, the Court has determined on three separate occasions that trial
counsel were ineffective in the development and presentation of mitigating evidence.10 7 And, in Miller-El v. Cockrell, the Court reversed a
decision of the Fifth Circuit that had rejected a death-sentenced inmate's Batson claim. 10 8 In each of these cases, the Court rejected the
state's contention that § 2254(d) barred relief. Thus, AEDPA appears
to be no serious obstacle to habeas relief if the Supreme Court determines that the state court decision under review significantly deviated
from its precedents.
Why has AEDPA not had a more profound impact on the Supreme Court's habeas corpus decisions? Is it because the Supreme
Court is a pro-habeas Court? No. 10 9 When Congress failed to act in
the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, a majority of the Supreme Court set
about to "reform" habeas corpus through the creation and refinement
of various common law habeas doctrines such as procedural default,
abuse of the writ, and Teague nonretroactivity. 110 The Court tried to
outsource habeas reform to Congress, but eventually did the job inhouse. Thus the "old great writ" was not so great in 1996 when the
'Johnny come lately" Congress passed AEDPA. But-at least for this

105
466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). The Court rejected ineffective assistance of counsel
claims in Strickland, Dardenv. Wainwright, 473 U.S. 928 (1985), Burgerv. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776
(1987), and Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993).
106
476 U.S. 79, 95-97 (1986).
107
See Williams, 529 U.S. at 362 (counsel was ineffective for failing to discover and
present available mitigating evidence); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (same);
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 2456 (2005) (same). On the other hand, the
Court has also reversed several court of appeals decisions, finding that counsel's performance at the sentencing phase was unreasonable and prejudicial. See, e.g., Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19 (2002) (per curiam); Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1 (2003) (per
curiam).
108
537 U.S. 322 (2003).
109
For example, Justice O'Connor has been frequently referred to as a moderate
member of the Court. While that may be true in relative terms, she was very conservative
in criminal procedure cases in general and habeas corpus cases in particular. In Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), for example, she wrote the majority opinion concluding
that Coleman had lost the right to any federal review of his convictions and death sentence
because his state postconviction attorney filed a notice of appeal late. Her opinion for the
Court began: "This is a case about federalism. It concerns the respect that federal courts
owe the States and the States' procedural rules when reviewing the claims of state prisoners
in federal habeas corpus." Id. at 726. Coleman was subsequently executed despite substantial evidence indicating he may have been innocent. SeeJOHN C. TUCKER, MAY Goo HAVE
MERCY 50-52, 327-30 (Dell Publishing 1998) (1997).
110 See supra Part 1.
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Court-enough appeared to be enough: The Court had done the job
that needed to be done.'I'
A second, and related, piece of this same phenomenon has to do
with who-institutionally-controls the scope of habeas corpus, Congress or the Court. On a number of occasions, both pre- and postAEDPA, the Court has indicated that it is primarily the role of Congress to determine the scope of the writ.1 12 I do not think that is true,
or-perhaps more accurately-I do not think the Court believes that
is true. The Court's pre-AEDPA curtailment of the scope of the writ,
despite Congressional inaction, and the failure to further curtail the
writ post-AEDPA, despite an alleged congressional directive, suggests
the opposite is true. The Court, or at least a majority of the Court,
believes that the role of Congress is secondary, and that it is primarily
the Court's responsibility to say how much habeas is enough.1 13 While
111
Professors Tushnet and Yackle have argued that AEDPA was a "symbolic" statute.
See Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologiesof the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DuKE L.J. 1
(1997). They argue that statutes, such as AEDPA, which are "enacted after substantial
judicial reconstruction of the law are likely to be largely symbolic." Id. at 3. Such statutes,
in their view, create a "host of interpretive issues," which courts will defuse by reading the
statute "to endorse, and to some degree fortify, the reforms they have already advanced."
Id. I agree with much that is in the piece, but I disagree that in passing AEDPA Congress
intended only to make a "pungent political statement." Id. at 5. First, I think this gives
Congress too much credit. There is no indication in the legislative history that Congress
realized that the Supreme Court had been engaging in a systematic (and successful) campaign to limit federal habeas review. Second, while the Court has held that AEDPA codifies some of its pre-AEDPA jurisprudence, see, e.g., Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483
(2000) ("Our conclusion follows from AEDPA's present provisions [§ 2254(c) governing
certificates of appealability], which incorporate earlier habeas corpus principles."); Felker
v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996) ("The Act also codifies some of the pre-existing limits
on successive petitions . . . ."), it has not done so in regard to § 2254(d). A number of

scholars, including Professor Yackle, believed that the Court would attempt to reconcile
§ 2254(d) with its pre-AEDPA nonretroactivtyjurisprudence. SeeYackle, supra note 63, at
382. Given the statutory language, this would have been a logical way for the Court to
reduce the number of "interpretive issues," i.e, the Court could have easily interpreted
§ 2254(d)'s prohibition against granting federal habeas corpus relief unless the state court
decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court" as codifying Teague's nonretroactivty
principles. However, the Court did not do so. In Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 272 (2002)
(per curiam), the Court, without further explanation, held that "the AEDPA and Teague
inquiries are distinct" and that, "in addition to performing any analysis required by
AEDPA, a federal court considering a habeas petition must conduct a threshold Teague
analysis when the issue is properly raised by the state."
112
See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172 (2001) ("Our task is to construe what
Congress has enacted.").
113 The Court acted in much the same way prior to AEDPA. It did not act doctrinally
but rather responsively in the context of particular cases that often raise narrow issues.
The Court's decisions were based on a complicated and constantly shifting balancing act
regarding the role of federal habeas corpus. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 489
(1991) ("[T]he doctrine of abuse of the writ refers to a complex and evolving body of
equitable principles informed and controlled by historical usage, statutory developments,
and judicial decisions.").
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the Court's view of habeas is undoubtedly quite narrow, it nonetheless
believes that habeas corpus "plays a vital role in protecting constitutional rights,"' 1

4

and that this is a historic role1

15

that Congress can

modify to some extent, but not, for all practical purposes, eviscerate.
Both pre- and post-AEDPA, the conservative majority of the Court believed that state court decisions generally should receive the benefit of
the doubt. But the same conservative majority also appears to realize,
quite correctly, that state courts cannot be completely trusted to vindicate constitutional rights, and thus there must, in some cases, be
16
meaningful federal review of state court decisions.'
114
Slack, 529 U.S. at 483; see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 312 (1989) (noting that
one purpose of habeas corpus is "'to assure that no man has been incarcerated under a
procedure which creates an impermissibly large risk that the innocent will be convicted"'
(quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
115 See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 512 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.,concurring) ("It
is not the boasting of empty rhetoric that has treated the writ of habeas corpus as the basic
safeguard of freedom in the Anglo-American world."); Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
318, 326 (1867) (noting that habeas corpus is a remedy for "every possible case of privation
of liberty contrary to the National Constitution").
116
I also think the argument can be made that in a number of decisions the Court has
been attempting to "reel in" outliers and establish a more uniform application of its decisions in the federal courts of appeals. For example, two of the three successful ineffective
assistance of counsel cases originated in the Fourth Circuit. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.
510 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000). The Fourth Circuit is notoriously
hostile to claims that capital trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. See
John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Fourth Circuit's "Double-EdgedSword": Eviscerating
the Right To Present MitigatingEvidence and Beheading the Right to the Assistance of Counsel, 58
MD. L. REv. 1480 (1999). In the "modern era" of capital punishment, only one deathsentenced inmate has prevailed on such a claim in that court of appeals. See Thomas-Bey v.
Nuth, 67 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision). And, in the same period,
death-sentenced inmates' overall success rate in the Fourth Circuit is less than 4%, a fraction of the national average. Blume, supra note 32, at 303. The Fifth Circuit has also been
very reluctant to grant habeas relief to state prisoners. See, e.g., Harvey Rice, 5th Circuit
Court Rules in Its Own Way, Hous. CHRON., July 6, 2005, at BI. The Miller-El case provides
substantial evidence of that. The Supreme Court first reversed the court of appeals decision refusing to even permit the habeas petitioner to raise his Batson claim on appeal.
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 344 (2003) ("We question the Court of Appeals' .. .
dismissive and strained interpretation of petitioner's evidence of disparate questioning.").
On remand, the Fifth Circuit panel rejected the petitioner's claim. See Miller-El v. Drecke,
361 F.3d 849 (5th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005). Its opinion had long verbatim
passages (without attribution) from the Supreme Court dissent. See id. Thereafter, the
Supreme Court again granted certiorari, reversed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit, and
granted the writ of habeas corpus. See Miller-El, 545 U.S. __,
125 S. Ct. 2317. In Tennard
v. Dretke, the Supreme Court also reversed a Fifth Circuit decision denying a habeas petitioner a certificate of appealability. 542 U.S. 274 (2004). In doing so, the Court demonstrated its impatience with the court of appeals. See id. at 283 ("Despite paying lipservice to
the principles guiding issuance of a COA, the Fifth Circuit's analysis proceeded along a
distinctly different track." (citation omitted)). And in Penly v. Johnson, the Court also reversed a Fifth Circuit decision denying a death-sentenced inmate's petition for writ of
habeas corpus. 532 U.S. 782 (2001). On the other hand, the Court has also reversed a
number of Ninth Circuit decisions granting the writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g., Brown v.
Payton, 544 U.S. __ , 125 S. Ct. 1432 (2005); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652
(2004); Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433 (2004) (per curiam); Yarborough v. Gentry, 540
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Admittedly, for a variety of reasons, the U.S. Supreme Court's
habeas decisions are not the only-and perhaps not the best-barometer of AEDPA's effects. A skeptical reader could plausibly maintain
that the lower federal courts are where the habeas action truly resides,
and any inquiry into AEDPA's effects that does not scrutinize developments in the federal courts of appeals is misguided. As Table 4 reflects, the available data from the federal courts of appeals do not
reveal that AEDPA has had a tremendous impact on the ability of a
habeas petitioner to ultimately secure a writ of habeas corpus. 117

U.S. 1 (2003) (per curiam); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); Woodford v. Visciotti,
537 U.S. 19 (2002) (per curiam); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 (2002) (per curiam). Thus,
one could look at the cases as a whole as the Court's attempt to establish a more consistent-and moderate-use of the writ of habeas corpus.
In most cases, the Supreme Court reverses the judgment of the lower court. This is
referred to as the "selection" effect. As one recent article states, "Reversals are a defining
feature of the Supreme Court: over the last decade, the Supreme Court reversed 64% of
the cases it heard." Chris Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary
Insights into the "Affirmance Effect" on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
357, 358 (2005). The authors posit that the "Court is more likely to grant certiorari to
review lower court decisions that are ideologically inconsistent with the Court's current
majority... and thus it is more likely to grant certiorari to reverse than to affirm the lower
court." Id. at 366.
117
Based on data maintained by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
the number of habeas petitions filed by state prisoners has remained relatively constant
over the last decade. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2004, there were 18,645 petitions filed, 214 of
which involved death-sentenced inmates. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2004 JUDICIAL BUSINESS 133 tbl.C-2 (2004) [hereinafter 2004JUDICIAL BUSINESS], available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/c2.pdf. In FY 2003, there were 18,972 petitions filed, 228 of which involved death-sentenced inmates. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, 2003 JUDICIAL BUSINESS 127 tbl.C-2 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 JUDICIAL BUSINESS],
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2003/appendices/c2.pdf. In FY 2002, there
were 19,615 petitions filed, 225 of which involved death-sentenced inmates. ADMIN. OFFICE
OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2002 JUDICIAL BUSINESS 130 tbl.C-2 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 JUDICIAL
BUSINESS], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/appendices/c02sep02.pdf. In
FY 2001, there were 20,436 petitions filed, 192 of which involved death-sentenced inmates.
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2001 JUDICIAL BUSINESS 131 tbl.C-2 (2001) [hereinafter
2001 JUDICIAL BUSINESS], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2001/appendices/
c02sep01.pdf. In FY 2000, there were 21,355 petitions filed, 259 of which involved deathsentenced inmates. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2000JUDICIAL BUSINESS 136 tbl.C-2
(2000) [hereinafter 2000 JUDICIAL BUSINESS], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus
2000/appendices/c2sepOO.pdf. In FY 1999, there were 20,493 petitions filed, 248 of
which involved death-sentenced inmates. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1999 JUDICIAL BUSINESS 137 tbl.C-2 (1999) [hereinafter 1999JUDICIAL BUSINESS], available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/judbusl999/cO2sep99.pdf. In FY 1998, there were 18,838 petitions
filed, 250 of which involved death-sentenced inmates. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
1998JUDICIAL BUSINESS 143 tbl.C-2 (1998) [hereinafter 1998JUDICtAL BUSINESS], availableat
http://www.uscourts.gov/dirrpt98/c02sep98.pdf. In FY 1997, there were 19,956 petitions
filed. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1997JUDICIAL BUSINESS 129 tbl.C-2 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 JUDICIAL BUSINESS], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicial-business/
c02sep97.pdf. However, given the increase in the number of incarcerated persons, the
actual number of petitions filed per 1,000 inmates has decreased.
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YEAR
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
TOTAL
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CASES IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS

Successful § 2254 cases
in federal courts

Total § 2254 cases
decided by the federal

Successful § 2254 case
percentage in federal

of appeal

courts of appeal

courts of appeal

28
28
35
39
59
50
51
31
321

4109
5303
5980
7366
7250
6957
7717
6826
51508

0.68%
0.53%
0.59%
0.53%
0.81%
0.72%
0.66%
0.45%

0.62%

Source: Table B-1A, "U.S. Courts of Appeals - Appeals Commenced, Terminated and Pending
by Nature of Suit or Offense," in the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business
reports from 1997 through 2004, cited in text note 117.

Several observations are worth making. First, the overall success
rate is very low. Less than 1% of state prisoners who file federal
habeas petitions ultimately prevail. Thus, any contention that the
lower federal courts are freely granting habeas corpus relief on legal
technicalities is not supported by the available data. Both before and
after AEDPA, it is the rare state prisoner who obtains the great writ.
Second, one could argue that since 2001 the success rate has steadily
declined. From this, one could posit that AEDPA is limiting the availability of habeas relief. Given that the Supreme Court held that
AEDPA did not apply to habeas cases that were pending when AEDPA
went into effect in 1996,118 it took several years for the majority of the
pre-Act cases to be disposed of. For this reason, most of the cases
decided by the courts of appeals from 1996 to 2000 were not controlled by AEDPA. 19 However, by 2001, the majority of habeas corpus
cases were governed by AEDPA and § 2254(d)'s limitation on relief
provision. 120 This fact, combined with several Supreme Court deci122
sions interpreting § 2254(d) 21 and other key AEDPA provisions,
suggests that AEDPA has made habeas relief even more difficult for
state prisoners to obtain in the lower federal courts.
If capital cases are examined, a similar pattern emerges, as shown
by Table 5 below.
118
See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997).
119
See, e.g., High v. Head, 209 F.3d 1257, 1262 n.4 (4th Cir. 2000) (case governed by
pre-AEDPA standards); Yeatts v. Angelone, 166 F.3d 255, 258 (4th Cir. 1999) (same).
120 Collier v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 2002) (case governed by AEDPA);
Dressler v. McCaughtry, 238 F.3d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 2001) (same).
121
See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
122
See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000) (interpreting § 2254(e) (2)).
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Year
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

TOTAL
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5. CAPITAL § 2254 PETITIONS

Number of Capital § 2254
petitions decided by the
federal courts of appeal
118
160
198
178
144
226
196

Number of successful
capital § 2254 cases
decided by the federal
courts of appeal
12
11
7
12
21
18
16

Successful capital
§ 2254 case
percentage
10%
7%
4%
7%
15%
8%
8%

149

6

4%

1369

103

8%

Source: Table B-1A, "U.S. Courts of Appeals -Appeals Commenced, Terminated and Pending
by Nature of Suit or Offense," in the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business
reports from 1997 through 2004, cited in text note 117.

Again, several observations are important. First, while habeas
petitioners are more successful in capital cases than in noncapital
ones, the overall success rate is still low. From 1997 to 2004, only 8%
of death-sentenced inmates were successful. Thus, the data would
appear to refute the contention made by habeas critics that federal
courts are thwarting state efforts to establish an effective death
penalty. Second, the capital case data also reflect a similar decline in
success rates from 2001 to 2004. The number of capital cases is much
smaller than noncapital; thus, trends are more difficult to ascertain.
For the reasons discussed above, a plausible argument can be made
that AEDPA has also made it more difficult for death-sentenced
inmates to obtain a new trial or sentencing hearing once the case
123
enters federal court.
123
One could also argue that examining only courts of appeals cases ignores trends in
the district courts where all habeas corpus cases are initially handled. However, I did not
have reliable data for petitioner success rates in the district courts. The data that are
available suggest that the number of cases in which the petitioner prevails at the district
court level has also not changed dramatically. In 1990, according to the Administrative
Office of the Courts, the petitioner prevailed in 2.9% of the cases. In 1996, the petitioner
prevailed in 3.01% of the cases. By 2003, the number of cases in which the petitioner
prevailed had fallen somewhat to 2.75%. Administrative Office data cited above were
compiled by the author from Federal Judicial Center, Federal Court Cases: Integrated
Database, 2003 (ICPSR Study No. 4026, last updated Apr. 22, 2005), http://webapp.icpsr.
umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-STUDY/04216.xml; FederalJudicial Center, FederalCourt Cases:
Integrated Database,2002 (ICPSR Study No. 4059, last updated Apr. 29, 2005), http://web
app.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-STUDY/04059.xml; Federal Judicial Center, Federal
Court Cases: Integrated Database, 2001 (ICPSR Study No. 3415, last updated Jan. 27, 2005),
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-STUDY/03415.xml; Federal Judicial
Center, Federal Court Cases: Integrated Database, 1970-2000 (ICPSR Study No. 8429, last
updated Apr. 29, 2005), http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-STUDY/08429.
xml. For a discussion of the reliability of this database, see Theodore Eisenberg & Margo
Schlanger, The Reliability of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Database: An Initial
Empirical Analysis, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1455 (2003). However, given the number of
cases, this variation is not statistically significant. One caveat should be noted. The
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There are several other indicators suggesting, however,
that AEDPA is affecting the disposition of cases in the lower federal
courts. First, the total percentage of habeas corpus cases in the federal courts of appeals that are disposed of on procedural grounds,
as opposed to on the merits, has risen since 1997. In 1997, 2,976
cases were terminated on procedural grounds, and 1,094 cases
were terminated on the merits. 124 Thus, 73% of all habeas cases in
1997 were decided on procedural grounds. By 2004, 82% of all
§ 2254(d) cases were terminated on procedural grounds. 12 5 Second,
the number of state prisoners who were denied permission to appeal
the denial of habeas relief has also risen.' 26 In 1997, 52% of all
habeas petitioners were denied permission to appeal by the federal
courts of appeals.' 27 By 2004, 61% of habeas petitioners were denied
a certificate of appealability. 128 Finally, at least since 2001, the
number of habeas petitions filed in the district courts, 12 9 pending in
Administrative Office does not differentiate procedural wins from substantive ones. Thus,
a district court decision granting an evidentiary hearing is classified as a case in which the
petitioner prevailed. However, that same petitioner may, in a subsequent year, ultimately
lose on the merits. Given the limitations of Administrative Office data, it cannot be
determined whether the petitioner prevailed on a procedural or substantive issue. Thus,
these percentages overstate success rates as I have defined success in this Article, i.e.,
whether the petitioner obtained habeas corpus relief. Furthermore, the data also reveal
that even considering procedural and substantive dispositions, the rates at which
petitioners prevail is very low. One highly relevant subgroup of cases thus missing from
this analysis are cases in which the petitioner prevails in the district court and, due to the
strength of the underlying claim, the state declines to perfect an appeal.
124 1997 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 117, at 81 tbl.B-1A, available at http://www.us
courts.gov/judicial-business/blasep97.pdf.
125
In 2004, 5,575 cases were terminated on procedural grounds and 1,215 cases were
decided on the merits. See 2004JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 117, at 81 tbl.B-lA, available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/bla.pdf.
126
In habeas proceedings, a petitioner does not have a right to appeal a district court
decision dismissing or denying a habeas action. Under pre-AEDPA law, a petitioner had to
obtain a certificate of probable cause to appeal, which required a "'substantial showing of
the denial of [a] federal right.'" Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983) (alteration in
original) (quoting Stewart v. Beto, 454 F.2d 268, 270 n.2 (2d Cir. 1971)). AEDPA only
slightly modified preexisting law regarding appeals, although it used slightly different
language; a habeas petitioner must now obtain a "certificate of appealability." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c) (1) (2000).
127
1997 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 117, at 104 tbl.B-5A, available at http://www.us
In 1997, 1,018 inmates were denied a
courts.gov/judicial-business/b5asep97.pdf.
certificate of probable cause to appeal, and 1,113 inmates were denied a certificate of
appealability. Id.
128
2004JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 117, at 104 tbl.B-5A, available at http://www.us
courts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/b5a.pdf. In 2004, 4,173 inmates were denied a
certificate of appealability and 2 were denied a certificate of probable cause to appeal. Id.
129
In 2001, 20,446 petitions were filed, which represents 17 petitions per 1,000 state
court inmates. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES tbl.2.9
(2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table2.09.pdf. In 2002,
19,615 petitions were filed (16 per 1000). Id. In 2003, 18,792 petitions were filed (15 per
1,000). Id. In 2004, 18,646 petitions were filed (14 per 1,000). Id. Given the steady rise in
the number of incarcerated persons, it is important to examine not the total number of
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the district courts, 130 and pending in the federal courts of appeals' 3'
have all declined. Thus, as Table 6 reflects, if one looks at success
rates (in capital and noncapital cases), petitions filed, and petitions
pending from 2001 to the present, AEDPA appears to be
circumscribing federal review of state court convictions.
TABLE

6.

HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONS FILED, PENDING, AND SUCCESS

RATES 2001-2004
§ 2254 Petitions § 2254 Petitions
Filed in U.S.
Pending in U.S.
YEAR District Court
District Court

§ 2254 Appeals
Pending in U.S.
Courts of Appeal

Petitioner
Petitioner
Success Rate Success Rate
(all cases)
(capital cases)

2001

20,436 (17 per
17,374
4,204
.81%
15%
1000 inmates)
2002 19,615 (16 per
17,280
4,335
.72%
8%
1000 inmates)
2003 18,972 (15 per
17,058
3,851
.66%
8%
1000 inmates)
2004 18,646 (14 per
16,952
3,980
.45%
4%
1000 inmates)
Source: Table B-IA, "U.S. Courts of Appeals-Appeals Commenced, Terminated and Pending
by Nature of Suit or Offense"; Table C-2, "U.S. District Courts-Civil Cases Commenced, by Basis
of Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit"; Table C-3A, "U.S. District Courts-Civil Cases Pending by
Nature of Suit and District" in the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Judicial Business
reports 2001 through 2004, cited in text note 123. Per capita rates derived from data sets
discussed in text note 123.
petitions filed, but the number of petitions in relation to the number of incarcerated
individuals. Furthermore, studies have demonstrated that prisoners sentenced to long
periods of incarceration are more likely to file a federal habeas petition than other
prisoners. Fred L. Cheesman II & Roger A. Hanson, A Tale of Two Laws Revisited:
Investigating the Impact of the PrisonerLitigation Reform Act and the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act 56 (2004), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/ResPreCivTwoLawsRevPub.pdf. Given the increase in both the number of incarcerated
persons and the length of sentences (attributable to mandatory minimum sentencing,
three strikes rules, etc.), it is not surprising that the number of petitions filed, while
dropping somewhat, has not fallen more. Furthermore, it is not clear that AEDPA was
intended to prevent inmates from filing habeas petitions. Rather, its provisions are more
logically read to encourage more prompt filing, to expedite consideration of cases that are
filed, and to limit the number of cases in which relief is granted. In fact, AEDPA's statute
of limitations may well encourage state prisoners to file a federal petition. Under preAEDPA law, when there was no statute of limitations, an incarcerated person who believed
(correctly or incorrectly) that she had only a slight chance of obtaining relief may well have
postponed challenging her conviction or sentence and ultimately decided not to do so.
However, an incarcerated person in the post-AEDPA regime may well decide to file a
federal petition because, if she fails to do so within the limitations period, the opportunity
for federal review is lost.
130
In 2001, 17,374 § 2254 petitions were pending in the district courts. See 2001
JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 117, at 143 tbl.C-3A, availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/jud
bus2001/appendices/c3asepOl.pdf. By 2004, the number of pending petitions had fallen
to 16,954. See 2004JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 117, at 145 tbl.C-3A, available at http://

www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/c3a.pdf.
131
In 2001, there were 4,204 § 2254 appeals pending in the federal courts of appeals.
See 2001 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 117, at 80 tbl.B-lA, available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/judbus200l/appendices/bOasepOl.pdf. In 2004, there were 3,980 pending appeals.
See 2004 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 117, at 82 tbl.B-IA, available at http://www.uscourts.

gov/judbus2004/appendices/bl a.pdf.
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Assuming AEDPA has curtailed to some extent federal "prodigality with the Great Writ"'1 32 in the lower federal courts, a reader might
ask why it has not had the same effect in the Supreme Court. The
answer most likely lies in the cases that the Court accepts for review.
The Court grants certiorari in only a fraction of the habeas cases entertained by the lower federal courts.1 33 These cases generally present
procedural or substantive questions that have divided the federal
courts of appeals, 13 4 situations where the Court believes the court of
1 35
appeals misconstrued the meaning of one of AEDPA's provisions,
or instances where the Court simply believes the court of appeals
made a serious error. 136 In other words, certiorari is granted to hard
cases and cases of clear error. Given the Court's discretionary review,
it is not surprising-in fact it is to be expected-that habeas petitioners would prevail more often in the Supreme Court than in the lower
federal courts.
B.

The "Bite"
1.

Unexpected Bite

Now, I will turn to AEDPA's bite. Prior to AEDPA there was no
statute of limitations in habeas matters, 137 and the timeliness of federal habeas petitions was determined by Habeas Rule 9(a), which was,
in effect, a form of laches.13 8 However, AEDPA's drafters included a
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 648 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
In 2003, for example, the Court granted certiorari in fewer than 80 of the
thousands of petitions filed. See Thomas C. Goldstein, Statisticsfor the Supreme Court's October
Term 2003, 73 U.S.L.W. 3045, 3046 (July 31, 2004).
134
See, e.g., Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. _
125 S. Ct. 2562, 2566 (2005) ("The issue
before us is one on which federal appellate courts have divided: Whether, under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15 (c) (2), Felix's amended [habeas] petition ... relates back to the
date of his original timely filed petition. .. ").
135
For example, in Williams v. Taylor,the Court granted certiorari to review the Fourth
Circuit's decision holding that AEDPA's evidentiary hearing provision, § 2254(e) (2), precluded an evidentiary hearing even under circumstances where the habeas petitioner was
completely without blame for the lack of fact development in state court. 529 U.S. 420,
429 (2000). A unanimous Court concluded that "comity is not served by saying a prisoner
'has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim' where he was unable to develop his claim
in state court despite diligent effort. In that circumstance, an evidentiary hearing is not
barred by § 2254(e) (2)." Id. at 437.
136
See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S ...
125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005) (reiterating that AEDPA's standards are "demanding but not insatiable"). Quoting its prior decision in the same case, the Court reminded the court of appeals that "'[d]eference does
not by definition preclude relief.'" Id (alteration in original) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003)). The Court ultimately concluded that the state court's
determination that the prosecutor did not exercise his peremptory challenges in a racially
discriminatory manner was "unreasonable as well as erroneous." Id. at 2340.
137
See Mayle, 545 U.S. at __,
125 S. Ct. at 2569 ("In enacting AEDPA in 1996, Congress imposed for the first time a fixed time limit for collateral attacks in federal court on a
judgment of conviction.").
138
Former Rule 9(a) provided:
132
133
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statute of limitations, which, in most circumstances, requires inmates
pursuing federal habeas review to file a petition within one year of the
conviction becoming final on direct review.1 39 The limitations period
is tolled during the time that "a properly filed application for State
post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending [in state
court]. "140 According to the Supreme Court, the limitations period

reflected "'Congress' decision to expedite collateral attacks by placing
stringent time restrictions on [them].'"141 Expedient filing, in turn,
1 42
promotes finality.
The pursuit of finality, however, has come at a significant cost.
The new statute of limitations has deprived thousands of potential
habeas petitioners of any federal review of their convictions, and in
some cases, their death sentences.1 43 In a significant number of the
cases, the failure to file in a timely manner was not necessarily the
habeas petitioner's fault. Like other AEDPA provisions, the statute of
limitations is very poorly drafted. This shoddy work product has led to
[A] petition may be dismissed if it appears that the state of which respondent isan officer has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition by delay in filing unless the petitioner shows that it is based on grounds
of which he could not have had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable
diligence before the circumstances prejudicial to the state occurred.
This part of Rule 9 has since been rendered moot, in most cases.
139 See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.....
125 S. Ct. 1807, 1810 (2005) ("(AEDPA)
establishes a 1-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas corpus petition."); Carey v.Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 216 (2002) ("(AEDPA) requires a state prisoner seeking a
federal habeas corpus remedy to file his federal petition within one year after his state
conviction has become final." (quotations omitted)). A conviction is final either when the
Supreme Court denies certiorari review or the time to file a petition for writ of certiorari
expires. See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527-28 (2003). There are several other
triggering events for finality, but they rarely come into play. The other circumstances that
can commence the one-year limitations period include: "impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution," 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)
(2000), a "constitutional right.., newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review," id.§ 2244(d) (1) (C), and newly discovered
facts that "could [not] have been discovered [previously] through the exercise of due diligence," id.§ 2244(d)(1) (D).
140 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
141
Mayle, 545 U.S. at -, 125 S. Ct. at 2570 (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Hicks, 283 F.3d 380, 388 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
142 SeeJohnson v. United States, 544 U.S. _,
_, 125 S.Ct. 1571, 1580 (2005) (interpreting the statute of limitations to not permit "delay [that] would thwart one of AEDPA's
principal purposes"); Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003) ("Congress enacted
AEDPA to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences, particularly in capital cases."); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 179 (2001) ("The 1-year limitation
period of § 2244(d) (1) quite plainly serves the well-recognized interest in the finality of
state court judgments ... [and] reduces the potential for delay on the road to finality by
restricting the time that a prospective federal habeas petitioner has in which to seek federal habeas review.").
143 Due to the large number of unpublished district court orders dismissing habeas
petitions as untimely, many of which are not appealed, it is impossible to say with precision
how many petitions have been deemed untimely. However, the number is definitely in the
thousands.
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numerous splits in the federal courts of appeals as to the meaning of
the statutory language. In turn, the Supreme Court has been forced
to resolve these circuit splits, and it has granted review in nine cases
involving AEDPA's statute of limitations.1 4 4 Four statute of limitations
cases were decided in the most recent Supreme Court Term; one case
1 45
is already pending on the Court's docket for next Term.
Ambiguity in drafting is especially problematic in the limitations
period context. A statute of limitations should clearly inform a party
who believes his legal rights have been violated as to when he must
commence an appropriate action. 146 In the habeas corpus context,
even more clarity is required given the complexity of the tolling provisions, the fact that most prisoners do not have counsel to assist in the
preparation of a habeas petition, the inadequacy of many prison law
libraries, and the potential unjust loss of liberty-and in some cases,
life.
144
See Mayle, 545 U.S. at __, 125 S. Ct. at 2570-71 (holding that an amended claim
in a federal petition does not "relate back" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2), and thereby
avoids AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations when it asserts a new ground for relief supported by facts that differ in time and type from those set forth in the original pleading);
Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. _,
_
, 125 S. Ct. 2478, 2481-82 (2005) (holding that
the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 begins to run on the date on which the
Supreme Court initially recognized the right, not the date on which that right was made
retroactive); Johnson, 544 U.S. at _,
125 S. Ct. at 1580 (holding that the vacatur of a
prior state conviction used to enhance a sentence is a "fact" that could start the one-year
limitations period); Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225 (2004) (holding that a federal court does
not have to warn a pro se petitioner that one of the consequences of dismissing a federal
petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims "without prejudice" may be
that his petition will be untimely when he returns to federal court); Carey v. Saffold, 536
U.S. 214 (2002) (holding that a case is "pending" for § 2244(d) (2) purposes during the
time between a lower state court's decision and the filing of a notice of appeal, and a case
is also "pending" in an original writ system during the period when a petitioner is preparing an original writ to a higher state court); Duncan, 533 U.S. at 180 (holding that a federal
habeas petition is not within the ambit of § 2244(d) (2) and thus does not toll the statutory
limitations period); Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) ("An application is 'filed' . . .
when it is delivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate court officer for placement into
the official record."); Chavis v. Lamarque, 382 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S.
Ct. 1969 (2005) (to be argued fall Term 2006).
145
The question presented in Lamarque v. Chavis is as follows:

Did the Ninth Circuit contravene this Court's decision in Carey v. Saffold
when it held that a prisoner who delayed more than three years before
filing a habeas petition with the California Supreme Court did not 'unreasonably' delay in filing the petitioner-and therefore was entitled to tolling
during that entire period-because the California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition without comment or citation, which the Ninth Circuit construes as a denial 'on the merits'?
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Lamarque, 125 S. Ct. 1969 (No. 04-721), 2004 WL
2758232.
146
SeeAgency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 150 (1987) (stating that uniform statutes of limitations help prevent intolerable clarity); Wilson v. Garcia,
471 U.S. 261, 272 (1985) (underscoring the importance of clarity in statutes of
limitations).
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At the time the statute was enacted, few scholars (or habeas practitioners) fully understood or appreciated the effect that the various
limitations provisions would have. Despite the fact that all habeas petitioners were given a one-year grace period in which to file their
habeas petitions, 147 the overwhelming majority of the post-AEDPA
cases, even to this day, involve the interpretation or application of the
various statute of limitations provisions. 148 In a number of the cases,
dismissal seems particularly harsh given all the circumstances. 49 In
most of these cases, the petitioner would certainly have ultimately lost
on the merits had he filed in a timely manner. However, the slight
possibility of success on the merits is not a justification for depriving
these individuals of any habeas review whatsoever, and certainly some
of the dismissed cases had meritorious claims. 150 In Rouse v. Lee, for
example, the petitioner, a death-sentenced inmate, presented powerful evidence that one of the jurors who participated in his capital trial
was biased. 15' Rouse, an African American, was convicted and sentenced to death by an all-white jury for the murder of an elderly white
female. The evidence Rouse presented in support of his federal peti147
See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 180 F.3d 349, 355 (1st Cir. 1999); Bennett v. Artuz,
199 F.3d 116, 119 (2d Cir. 1999), affd, 531 U.S. 4 (2000); Brown v. O'Dea, 187 F.3d 572,
577 (6th Cir. 1999), vacated on other grounds, 530 U.S. 1257 (2000); Nichols v. Bowersox, 172
F.3d 1068, 1073 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Brown v. Angelone, 150 F.3d 370, 374-75 (4th
Cir. 1998); Gendron v. United States, 154 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); Lovasz v.
Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 148-49 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Flores, 135 F.3d 1000, 1006
(5th Cir. 1998); Wilcox v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210 (lth Cir. 1998) (per
curiam); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737, 745-46 (10th Cir. 1997).
148
See JOHN H. BLUME ET AL., 17 FED. HABEAS CORPUS UPDATE § III-A, at 304-459
(2004).
149
In one case, the district court granted the petitioner a fourteen-day extension beyond the limitations period. The court of appeals, however, held that the district court
erred in equitably extending the limitations period. See Spencer v. Sutton, 239 F.3d 626,
630 (4th Cir. 2001). In another, a petitioner sought a voluntary dismissal to return to state
court to pursue an unexhausted claim. After exhausting his state court remedies, he returned to the district court, which concluded that his counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. The court of appeals concluded, based on the intervening decision of
the Supreme Court in Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001), that the petition was untimely, explaining that "Cross-Bey's lack of understanding of the law and the effect of his
voluntary dismissal, while regrettable, does not amount to an extraordinary circumstance
beyond his control." Cross-Bey v. Gammon, 322 F.3d 1012, 1016 (8th Cir. 2003). In Helton
v. Secretayy for the Dep't of Corrections, the petitioner's failure to file in a timely manner was
based on a letter he received from his state collateral counsel erroneously calculating the
limitations period. 259 F.3d 1310 (lth Cir. 2001) (per curiam). In Garza v. Dretke, the
case was dismissed even though petitioner's counsel told him they would file the federal
petition in a timely manner. No. SA-04-CA-645-XR, 2004 WL 2385002 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 25,
2004). In Marengo v. Conway, the state appellate court failed to provide petitioner with
notice that his appeal was denied, thus leading to the untimely filing of the federal petition. 342 F. Supp. 2d 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
150
Most inmates who file federal habeas petitions do not have attorneys. Duncan v.
Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001) (BreyerJ., dissenting).
151
339 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905 (2004).
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tion revealed that the juror in question intentionally failed to disclose
that his mother had been murdered by an African-American male
(who was executed for the offense); the juror had contempt for all
African Americans and frequently used racial slurs; the juror believed
African Americans valued life less than white persons; and the juror
believed African-American males raped white females in order to
"brag to their friends." 152 Despite the strength of Rouse's substantive
claim, the court of appeals dismissed the petition as time barred because his attorneys filed the habeas petition one day late. In refusing
to grant equitable tolling, the court concluded that neither the severity of his death sentence nor the strength of the claim presented was
relevant to the equitable tolling analysis. 15 3 In sum, AEDPA's statute
of limitations has had a significant impact on habeas corpus litigation.
2.

Future Bite

As noted previously, the Supreme Court in many respects has said
very little about § 2254(d). Since Williams v. Taylor, the Court hasfor the most part-gravitated toward a talismanic formulation of
§ 2254(d), which it incants before moving on to the merits of the petitioner's claims. 154 But a number of significant issues remain unresolved. For example, the Court has said that "objectively
unreasonable" means more than simply incorrect. 55 However, it has
provided almost no guidance regarding the necessary increment of
error warranting habeas relief. 15 6 This has left the lower federal
courts somewhat at sea. Some courts have opined that "[e]ven clear
1 57
error, standing alone, is not a ground for awarding habeas relief."
Other courts have taken a more moderate approach, stating that
"'[s]ome increment of incorrectness beyond error is required,' but
that 'increment need not be great."' 1

58

Still, others have taken a

more fluid approach, stating that "[i]t is enough if the Supreme
Court's general principles can be discerned and if, respectfully but

152

Id. at 257 (Motz, J., dissenting).

153

Id. at 251.

See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) ("The 'unreasonable application'
clause requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous." (quoting
§ 2254(d))).
156
In Andrade, the Court did say that it was more than "clear error," but provided no
additional guidance. Id.
157
Stephens v. Hall, 407 F.3d 1195, 1202 (11 th Cir. 2005).
158
Henry v. Poole, 409 F.3d 48, 68 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Francis S. v. Stone, 221
F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2000)). In Poole, the court stated that the increment of error "falls
somewhere between" merely erroneous and erroneous to all reasonable jurists. Id.
154

155
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with confidence, we think that failure to [grant habeas relief] would
59
be an unreasonable application of those principles."'
Another important issue that has frequently divided the lower
federal courts is what significance an unexplained or summary state
court decision should have. When a state court fails to explain why it
rejected an inmate's constitutional claims, a federal habeas court cannot meaningfully determine whether that decision was "contrary to"
or involved "an unreasonable application of' Supreme Court precedent. For all the federal court knows, the state court did not identify
or consider the relevant Supreme Court decisions. If AEDPA's purpose was to give the state courts the benefit of the doubt if and when
they make a good faith effort to identify and apply the correct constitutional doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court, then it does not
seem unreasonable to require that the state court articulate why it rejected a particular claim. If it fails to explain such, then the federal
court should not be constrained by § 2254(d)'s limitation on federal
relief, and the issue should be reviewed de novo.
Nevertheless, the Court appeared to reject this reasoning in Early
v. Packer.160 A Ninth Circuit panel granted the writ of habeas corpus.
In doing so, it concluded that § 2254(d) did not preclude relief because the state court decision at issue did not cite any federal law,
"much less the controlling Supreme Court precedents."' 6' The Supreme Court concluded that "[a]voiding [§ 2254(d)'s] pitfalls does
not require citation of our cases-indeed, it does not even require
awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result
of the state-court decision contradicts them." 62 This makes little
practical sense. In Williams v. Taylor, for example, the Court con159
White v. Coplan, 399 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 2005). The court also rejected the state's
argument that relief must be denied because there was no Supreme Court case "directly on
all fours" with the present case. Id. In the court's view, "AEDPA requires no such thing."
Id.
160 537 U.S. 3 (2002) (per curiam).
161
Packer v. Hill, 291 F.3d 569, 578 (9th Cir. 2002), revd sub nom. Early, 537 U.S. 3.
162
Early, 537 U.S. at 8. However, the standard that the state court applied in Early v.
Packer was more forgiving to the defendant than the relevant federal constitutional standard. On that basis, some lower federal courts have concluded that § 2254(d) applies
when the state court makes no reference to federal law as "long as the standard it applied
was as demanding as the federal standard." Oswald v. Bertrand, 374 F.3d 475, 477 (7th Cir.
2004). The Supreme Court's reasoning, to the extent it was reasoning, in Packer is even
more puzzling given that it does not apply § 2254(d) when the state court, in the course of
issuing its decision, fails to address an issue. In Wiggins v. Smith, for example, the state
court rejected Wiggins's ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the performance prong,
and thus failed to discuss the prejudice prong. See 539 U.S. 510 (2003). After concluding
that the state court's resolution of the performance prong constituted an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law, the Court turned to the prejudice issue. In
doing so, the Court eschewed § 2254(d): "[O]ur review is not circumscribed by a state
court conclusion with respect to prejudice, as neither of the state courts below reached this
prong of the Strickland analysis." Id. at 534.
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cluded that the Virginia Supreme Court decision rejecting petitioner's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim was both "contrary to" and an
"unreasonable application of' Supreme Court precedent because it
"mischaracterized at best the appropriate rule"1 63 and because the
state court "failed to evaluate the totality of the available mitigating
evidence" in assessing prejudice.1 64 The Court knew the state court
erred, however, only because the state court issued an opinion explaining why it rejected petitioner's claim. Thus, state courts that offer little or no explanation for their decisions obtain a windfall;
relying on Early v. Packer, a number of federal courts of appeals presume the state court identified and applied the correct federal law. 165
It is unclear why a federal habeas court would so assume. Other
courts, faced with unexplained state court decisions, have adopted
what they refer to as an "intermediate approach" involving an "independent review of the record and applicable law to determine
whether, under the AEDPA standard, the state court decision is contrary to federal law, unreasonably applies clearly established law, or is
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented."' 66 Even these courts, however, have not articulated precisely how such an "independent review" would work.
Furthermore, the Court has made very little effort to reconcile
several pre-AEDPA doctrines, e.g., the Teague nonretroactivity doctrine, with the dictates of § 2254(d). Both doctrines currently coexist
in ajurisprudential crazy quilt. Under Teague a court asks whether the
163

164

529 U.S. 362, 397 (2000).
Id.

165
See, e.g., Schaetzle v. Cockrell, 343 F.3d 440, 443 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub nom.
Schaetzle v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 1154 (2004) ("Because a federal habeas court only reviews the
reasonableness of the state court's ultimate decision, the AEDPA inquiry is not altered
when, as in this case, state habeas relief is denied without an opinion. For such a situation,
our court: (1) assumes that the state court applied the proper 'clearly established Federal
law'; and (2) then determines whether its decision was 'contrary to' or 'an objectively unreasonable application of' that law." (citations omitted)); Reid v. True, 349 F.3d 788, 799
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1097 (2003) ("[W]hen the state court does not articulate a
rationale for its decision, our analysis focuses solely on the result reached, and application
of the 'contrary to' prong is necessarily limited to determining whether the state court
decision is contrary to a decision reached by the Supreme Court on indistinguishable
facts."). The Reid court rejected petitioner's argument that although the state court decision contained no explanation, it should be presumed that the state court applied a rule
.contrary to" Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), when rejecting his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, since the Virginia Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Warden of the Mecklenburg Correctional Center, 487 S.E.2d 194 (1997), rev'd sub nom. Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), was the governing state court precedent at the time petitioner's case was decided. See Reid, 349 F.3d at 799-800.
166
Howard v. Bouchard, 405 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Cobbs v. McGraff,
123 F. App'x 794, 795 (9th Cir. 2005). Some courts apply § 2254(d) to summary decisions,
even those "without even 'cursory reasoning,'" but fail to explain precisely how they conduct the AEDPA analysis. Turner v. Tafoya, 123 F. App'x 889, 892 (10th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Turner v. Ulibarri, 126 S. Ct. 86 (2005).
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petitioner seeks the benefit of a new rule. If he does, then the petitioner may not obtain the benefit of the rule unless he satisfies one of
Teague's two very narrow exceptions. Suppose that the petitioner is
relying on a new rule that is retroactive because it satisfies one of the
exceptions. For example, the Supreme Court held last Term that persons under the age of eighteen at the time of their offense could not
be sentenced to death. 167 This rule, while clearly new, would satisfy
the first Teague exception. 1 68 Thus the nonretroactivty bar would not
preclude a federal court from granting the writ of habeas corpus. But
does the claim satisfy § 2254(d)? Assuming the state court rejected
the inmate's claim prior to the Supreme Court's decision, the state
court decision would be neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, the clearly established law at the time of the state court
decision. Until the Court decides whether and how Teague and
§ 2254(d) operate, and whether, and to what extent, the Teague exceptions are incorporated into § 2254(d), such anomalous results are
possible. 169
Two other related issues that the Court has not resolved could
significantly affect § 2254(d)'s bite. The first relates to whether the
lack of full and fair process in state postconviction proceedings renders § 2254(d) inapplicable. In Valdez v. Cockrell,170 the Fifth Circuit
said no, despite the fact that the state habeas judge in Valdez's case
admittedly did not read the trial record-he maintained that he did
not have time to do so-and he lost many of the exhibits offered by
Valdez's counsel, thus refusing to consider the information in the exhibits. 7 1 Faced with this record, the federal district court convened
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. __ , 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
The first exception makes retroactive rules that place "'certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe."' Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401
U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). This exception also applies to rules prohibiting a "certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense." Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989).
169
Another area where the Court has failed to resolve tensions between pre-AEDPA
jurisprudence and AEDPA involves situations in which the state court determines that
there was constitutional error, but the error was harmless based on the Supreme Court's
decision in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Some courts have examined the
state court decisions to determine if the state court's harmless error analysis was an unreasonable application of Chapman. See, e.g., Zappulla v. New York, 391 F.3d 462, 467 (2d Cir.
2004). This would appear to be the approach embraced by the Supreme Court. See Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12 (2003) (per curiam). Other courts, however, have looked to the
prejudice standard for habeas corpus cases established pre-AEDPA in Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U.S. 619 (1993). See, e.g., Nevers v. Killinger, 169 F.3d 352 (6th Cir. 1999). Some
courts, inexplicably, do both. See, e.g.,Jones v. Polk, 401 F.3d 257, 264-66 (4th Cir. 2005)
(holding that the state court unreasonably applied Chapman, but that the error was not
prejudicial under Brecht).
170
274 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001).
171
Valdez v. Johnson, 93 F. Supp. 2d 769, 776 (S.D. Tex. 1999), affd in part, vacated in
167
168

part sub nom. Valdez, 274 F.3d 941.
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an evidentiary hearing and ultimately granted habeas relief, finding
that Valdez's trial counsel were ineffective in failing to develop and
present mitigating evidence. In doing so, the district court determined that § 2254(d) and (e) were for the most part inapplicable due
to the lack of full and fair process provided by the state court.17 2 The
court of appeals reversed, holding that "a full and fair hearing is not a
17 3
prerequisite to the application of ...§ 2254's deferential scheme."'
The dissenting judge noted that it makes
little sense to require a federal district court to conduct its own evidentiary hearing because of material deficiencies in the state court
proceeding, yet at the same time require the district court to disregard the fully developed evidence presented in its own court and
instead defer to the decision of the state court made on an incom174
plete record.
The district court and the dissent have the more defensible argument.
Even under the most restrictive conceptions of habeas corpus, i.e., the
Bator process model, 17 5 robust habeas review is warranted when the
habeas petitioner does not receive adequate process in the state
courts. Furthermore, to the extent AEDPA provides incentives via the
applicability of § 2254(d) and (e) to the state court's resolution of
factual and legal claims presented by inmates challenging their convictions and death sentences, it is counterintuitive and counterproductive to apply these provisions when the state court fails to fulfill
its end of the bargain by engaging in meaningful review of the inmate's federal constitutional claims.
The final issue worth mentioning is whether § 2254(d) applies in
cases where the state district attorney or the state attorney general
drafts the order denying collateral relief. Some readers may be surprised to learn that in a number of states this is the prevailing practice. The attorney for the prosecuting agency submits a proposed
order that the court frequently signs without making a single change.
Many of these orders contain unsupported factual findings, nonexistent procedural defaults, and tenuous legal conclusions. This prac76 It
tice, while generally frowned upon, is also generally tolerated.
should not be.
Eventually these and other AEDPA issues currently percolating in
the lower federal courts will find their way to the Supreme Court.
How the Court resolves these issues will, in turn, have a significant
impact on AEDPA's future bite.
172
173
174
175
176

Id. at 777-78.
Valdez, 274 F.3d at 959.
Id. (Dennis, J.,dissenting) (quoting petitioner's brief).
See Bator, supra note 26.
See, e.g., Trevino v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 173, 180-81 (5th Cir.).
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CONCLUSION

In this Article, I have argued that AEDPA was, in many respects,
more "hype" than "bite." For the most part this is true because by the
time AEDPA's habeas "reform" measures were enacted, there was very
little habeas left. Beginning in the 1970s, a conservative Supreme
Court systematically limited the scope of the writ by erecting procedural barriers that made it difficult for state court inmates to thread the
habeas needle. Thus, AEDPA may not have been too little, but it was
too late. Because the Court had substantially completed the task of
curtailing access to the writ, AEDPA has had a limited effect. This is
especially true at the Supreme Court, where habeas petitioners have
been successful at approximately the same rate as they were in the
years immediately preceding AEDPA, a period in which the Supreme
Court's judicially imposed habeas limitations were in effect. However,
AEDPA does seem to have made it more difficult, especially in recent
years, for petitioners to succeed in the federal courts of appeals.
Given the number of exonerations in recent years, the scope of the
writ-if it is to retain its historical function as a safeguard of freedom
in our criminal justice system-should be expanded, not contracted,
before the "bite" of judicial and congressional habeas reform exceeds
the "hype" and effectively insulates even the most egregious state
court decisions from federal collateral attack.
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